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RACE-CONSCIOUS DIVERSITY ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS:
FURTHERING A COMPELLING INTERESTt
Marty B. Lorenzo*
This Article argues that narrowly tailored, race-conscious admissions
programs can be employed to achieve a more diverse student body and
consequently a more enlightened and egalitarian society. An
admissions body which looks beyond traditional academic indicators
and explores the whole person of each applicant will matriculate a
group of students with a wide variety of race, gender, class and other
backgrounds, thereby fostering a robust exchange of ideas among these
students. Pointing to the enduring precedential value of Bakke as well
as the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court, this Article asserts
that the Courts would likely uphold a program aimed at promoting
diversity. The Article concludes by describing the ideal diversity
program and why Asian Americans, in particular, should support these
programs.
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In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way.'
INTRODUCTION
The history of abuse associated with race-based classifications
and their use to exclude disempowered people speaks for itself.2
Justice Powell stated that "unless [race-based classifications] 3 are
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
2. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (addressing a curfew
applicable only to persons of Japanese ancestry); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (striking down a California laundry permit ordinance which was purposefully
administered to exclude all Chinese from the laundry business); see also Amendments
to the Civil Code, 23d Sess., ch. XLI, § 1. The Acts Amendatory of the Codes of Cali-
fornia (1880) (stating that no license must be issued "authorizing the marriage of a
white person with a negro, mulatto, or mongolian"), amended by Stats. 1933, Ch 105,
§ 1, at 561 (extending the anti-miscegenation laws to members "of the Malay race" to
prohibit Filipinos from marrying whites) repealed 1959.
3. The term "race-conscious" has been criticized as merely being a less officious
way of saying "race-based." However, these two terms differ. In this Article I use the
term "race-based" to refer to classifications where "race" was the primary, if not sole,
factor considered and where the individual's race was not explored in the larger
context of social reality. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1063 (1991) (defining race-based as indicating "decisions and
conduct that would have been different but for the race of those benefited or
disadvantaged by them.") citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF LEGAL POL'Y, REP. TO
THE ATT'Y GEN., REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION: "DISPARATE IMPACT" AND THE
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strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote no-
tions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.' 4 It
is understandable how that history has made America gun-shy
when it comes to addressing the issue of race. Many have tried to
brush the issue aside by painting broadly with phrases such as: "[i]n
the eyes of government, we are just one race... American."5 At best,
this view is merely an attempt to ignore the issue. At worst, it is a
sophisticated way to cover up the problems associated with the pol-
icy of assimilation.6
concept "race-based" is the polar opposite of "colorblind." Neither is acceptable
because both run counter to the goal of diversity.
On the other hand, I use the term "race-conscious" to indicate decisions that
consciously recognize the social reality of race and the impact it has on the treatment
of individuals. See Aleinikoff, supra, at 1065 n.19 (using "race-conscious" to refer to a
"precognitive stance, a set of assumptions and mental filters that channel and influ-
ence what we label a problem, how we perceive it, and how we gather and analyze
data"). Recognizing the social reality of race, i.e., that race influences how one per-
ceives reality and how one is perceived by others, is the first and essential step
towards stabilizing this country's "race-relations" and toward allowing America's
different cultures to grow and make our society stronger from the benefits of diver-
sity. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 847 (recognizing that
"racial cultures form a significant element of what goes into the construction of our
social relations" and that realizing this is a "pre-condition to meaningful negotiation of
the terms of our social spaces").
My purposes for using the term "race-conscious" are threefold. First of all, I use
the term to emphasize the necessity of recognizing the social reality of race and its
external and internal effects on racially diverse individuals. By "external effects of
race," I mean those effects on an individual that stem from society's different
treatment of the racially diverse. By "internal effects of race," I refer to a diverse
individual's perspective which stems from having experienced life in the context of
another culture and having experienced the external effects of race. Second, I intend
the term to refer to classifications where race is a threshold question but not the sole
factor. Allowing race to be the sole determinative factor in a decision, perpetuates the
negative external effects of race. This may be avoided by recognizing the precognitive
stance of social race while considering other personal characteristics. Third, I use the
term "race-conscious" to encourage the .positive characterizations of
racial/community identification. Race consciousness promotes recognition of the
internal effects of race and fosters an atmosphere where racially diverse individuals
are encouraged to retain their culture.
This threefold use of the term coincides with what I see as the overarching goal
of diversity: to further equality and strengthen our nation by promoting a "race-
consciousness" which engenders pride in one's heritage and acknowledges persons as
individuals in the context of the American social reality of which race is an integral
part.
4. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
5. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment).
6. 1 use the term "assimilation" to refer to the process whereby a host society fails to
recognize and accept the validity of the cultural differences of an ethnic group,
thereby forcing members of that group to give up their cultural identity and conform
to the cultural characteristics and patterns of the host society in order to access social
institutions. See Dana C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and
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Race is both illusion and reality. The common misconception of
"genetic race" identifiable by an individual's morphology is an illu-
sion. However, the social consequences attached to our morphology
are reality. Professor Ian Haney-Lopez suggests that "although bio-
logical race does not exist, social race is very far from being an
illusion in providing a link between what we look like and who we
are. Race and identity... are relationally tied to one another across
the unstable medium of communities."' Although racial and ethnic
groupings are to a large extent social constructs, race is also a per-
sonal characteristic, a reflection of one's heritage, and often an
indication of community and social identity. Those who seek a col-
orblind nation would have us forget our respective heritages, ignore
the social reality of race, and assimilate into the American melting
pot.9 In contrast, diversity acknowledges and celebrates the salient
differences that give our nation strength, and thus provides a foun-
dation for fostering equality through participation and
empowerment of diverse groups. One goal of diversity is to raise
cultural awareness and destroy the illusion of a genetic race, while
preserving and celebrating those cultural differences which
Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1075 n.152 (1994) (citing MILTON M. GORDON,
ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL
ORIGINS, 71 tbl. 5 (1964)). Assimilationists ignore the contributions of the diverse eth-
nicities that helped form and continue to shape this country while defining
"American" based on a Western European paradigm. See Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the
Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the of Separatism and Conflict
in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 869-871 (1993). Ex-
amples of modem assimilationist treatment include the "English-only Movement"
which claims that large influxes of non-English-speaking Asian and Latino immigrants
threaten our national identity and the Model Minority Myth. See Chiu, supra, at 1078-
81; see also discussion of Model Minority Myth infra Part III.A.
7. Ian F. Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 61 (1994). Racial representations
turns into a form of discrimination that is often overlooked, especially in the case of
Asian Americans. See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Beyond Black and White: Racializing Asian
Americans in a Society Obsessed with O.J., 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 171-202
(1995).
8. See Haney-Lopez, supra note 7.
9. Assimilation runs counter to diversity as it calls for the destruction of differences
and demands the creation of one homogenous society. Professor Sheila Foster has
noted that "[a] norm of neutrality toward salient differences unjustly burdens only
certain individuals to relinquish their identities in order to make it easier for society to
treat all the same." Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the
Concept of "Diversity," 1993 WiS. L. REV. 105, 151. Moreover, assimilation ignores the
benefits already gained from the presence of a diverse population and glosses over the
contributions of this nation's racially diverse people. See, e.g., Stephen Gottlieb, In the
Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of "Bending" History in Public Secondary
Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 497 (arguing that the one-sided perspective of high school
history textbooks prevents students from being exposed to diverse viewpoints on
controversial issues). By robbing diverse groups of their place in this nation's forma-
tion, assimilation perpetuates disempowerment and ensures the inability of diverse
groups to define their place in society.
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strengthen our American heritage. Another goal of diversity is to
empower diverse groups and foster their participation in all levels of
society in furtherance of equality because diversity is necessarily
linked to equality. Moreover, diversity itself is a goal which encom-
passes the above and seeks to ensure that diverse groups are part of
the process that shapes society and their roles within it.
Recent political skirmishes regarding affirmative action,0 the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena" and the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Hopwood v. Texas 2
warn that the current use of race-conscious classifications may soon
change. Even though the need to encourage diversity in our nation
and in our schools still exists, 4 these recent developments may give
pause to university administrations and admissions directors when
contemplating their admissions policies. The current backlash
against affirmative action and the specter of litigation may discour-
age university administrators from implementing race-conscious
diversity admissions programs. The fact that Adarand imposes strict
scrutiny on all race-conscious measures may be further discourage-
ment. However, neither political posturing nor the Court's decision
in Adarand demonstrate that there is no longer a need for race-
conscious measures.
10. See President William J. Clinton, Affirmative Action, Address at National Ar-
chives and Records Administration (July 19, 1995), in 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1334 (July 24, 1995); Interview with Governor Pete Wilson (R-CA), available in LEXIS,
News Library, News File (July 19, 1995); Ralph C. Carmona, UC Should Not Be Caught
Up in Partisan Politics, S.F. CHRON., July 20, 1995, at A23; Proposed Cal. Const.
Amend. X (introduced Feb. 17, 1995) (forbidding racial preferences by any state entity,
including state educational institutions, except where federally mandated); see also
Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893,
896-99 (1994) (describing unfavorable public opinion toward affirmative action).
11. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (requiring the strict scrutiny test for all governmental
race-classifications).
12. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.) (declaring the admissions program used by the University
of Texas School of Law in 1992 to be unconstitutional), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996) (denying certiorari for lack of genuine controversy because the 1992 admissions
program was discontinued).
13. "Notwithstanding the Clinton administration's ringing endorsement of affirma-
tive action, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Deval Patrick acknowledged..
. that some federal affirmative action plans will not meet the stricter standards [under
Adarand]." DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, July 21, 1995 (BNA) at A140. However, this
by no means indicates that affirmative action, much less the need for it or the use of
race-conscious measures, will disappear overnight.
14. White men are 48% of the college educated work force but hold over 90% of the
top jobs in the news media, over 90% of the officer positions and 88% of the director-
ships in American corporations, 86% of the partnerships in major law firms, and 85%
of the tenured college professorships. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 154 tbl. 234, 405-07, tbl.
644, 426 tbl. 671 (1993).
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This Article argues that diversity is essential to equality because
it provides a foundation for equal participation on all levels of soci-
ety and reduces discrimination on all levels of society. The equal
participation of diverse individuals in the decision-making proc-
esses of society's institutions will provide those individuals with an
opportunity to determine the standards by which they will be
judged. Equality hinges on such participation.
Education is the gateway to success in other aspects of life. It
has also been noted that the campus is a microcosm of society."
Therefore diversity in our student bodies is absolutely essential to
achieving diversity in the workplace and elsewhere in society. 6 This
Article focuses on diversity in the educational setting as a starting
place for equal participation in society. Diversity admissions pro-
grams" serve the goal of equality by promoting the participation of
diverse groups in education. Additionally, diversity admissions
programs cultivate racially diverse leaders and, indirectly, create a
group of leaders who have been exposed to diverse viewpoints. By
increasing participation of diverse groups and enlightening non-
diverse individuals to diverse viewpoints and interests, diversity
admissions programs further the goal of equality. Diversity in law
schools is essential, as a legal education is seen as an important step
in creating future judges, attorneys, and legislators. 8 Moreover, a
heterogeneous student body in the law school is better equipped to
serve the needs of the diverse community. For these reasons, this
Article focuses specifically on diversity admissions programs in the
law school context. However, much of the analysis is applicable to
other educational contexts.
15. Foster, supra note 9, at 106.
16. An educational institution's pursuit of a diverse student body has been deemed
a compelling interest and, therefore, given greater consideration. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at
314 ("[Tlhe interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's admis-
sions program ... ").
17. A diversity program in the context of education is a program that seeks to di-
versify a school's student body through positive measures to increase enrollment of
diverse students. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing diversity
programs).
18. Lawyers occupy positions in society which enable them to work for the com-
mon good. Professor Bill Ong Hing notes:
Lawyers and the legal system play central roles in the resolution of cases in-
volving race relations. Community lawyers play an especially central role in
this respect because they have community stature and they represent the racial
and ethnic groups caught up in conflict. In spite of all the lawyer bashing, law-
yers are often viewed as community leaders and continue to enjoy a certain
amount of community respect.... Lawyers can either defuse racial and ethnic
tensions and build bridges between communities or intensify social divisions
depending on how they handle each case.
[VOL. 2:361
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Because diversity admissions programs benefit society as a
whole, this Article is a call for open support of race-conscious di-
versity programs by all members of society, but especially law
school and university administrations, their admissions depart-
ments, and the people of diverse communities. Additionally, this
Article addresses issues of particular concern to the Asian Ameri-
can19 community, such as the model minority myth and preference
for whites over Asians that glass ceilings represent. Asian Ameri-
cans are among the fastest growing ethnicities2° and yet one of the
21least vocal in the political process. Moreover, Asian Americans are
Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for
the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 931 (1995). With greater exposure to and un-
derstanding of diverse viewpoints and individuals during law school, lawyers will be
in a better position to build bridges between communities.
19. The term "Asian American" does not represent a monolithic group. Asians have
been crossing the Pacific Ocean for the North American Continent since 1565 when
the Manila galleon trade between Mexico and the Philippines began. FRED CORDOVA,
FILIPINOS: FORGOTTEN ASIAN AMERICANS 1, 9 (1983). The first Asian immigrants to
settle on soil that is now part of the Continental United States were Filipino
"Manilamen" who jumped ship in the Spanish Provincial Capital of New Orleans in
1763. Id. at 9; HERBERT R. BARRINGER ET AL., ASIANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS IN THE
UNITED STATES 3 (1993). Chinese immigration began in the 1840s as Chinese laborers
left their homes by the tens of thousands to come to the United States. RONALD
TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 31
(1989) Japanese began arriving in Hawaii in significant numbers beginning in the
1880s and on the mainland in the 1890s. Id. at 42. Between 1903 and 1920, 8000
Koreans came to the United States. Id. at 53. The Vietnamese, Cambodians, Hmong,
and Laotians have immigrated since 1965. BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING
ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 124-32 (1993). Pacific Islanders from
Samoa, Tonga and Guam have also begun to immigrate.
Even though Asian imnigrants come from the various countries mentioned
above, the term "Asian Americans" has been used to group us all together. Although
the term "Asian American" originated out of the dominant culture's need to
categorize, the term also serves as a unifying point for our community. In this Article I
use the term "Asian American" in the positive light of community identity, and I
include the diverse ethnicities mentioned above. I do not intend the use of the terms
"Asian American" and "Asian" to disregard the uniqueness of Pacific Islander
ethnicities.
20. Asian Americans, currently 3.5 percent of the population, will provide 14 per-
cent of new growth. Snapshot of America at Mid-Decade, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 1997, at 12.
Non-white Hispanic Americans, already 11 percent of the population, will provide 40
percent of the future growth. Id. The Asian American share of the population will
more than double, to 8.2 % in 2050 from 3.5 percent in 1996. Katherine Q. Seelye, U.S.
of Future: Grayer and More Hispanic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at B16. By the year
2050, non-white, Hispanic Americans will outnumber the nation's total of African
Americans, Asian Americans and Native Americans combined, and will account for
one-fourth of the population, up from 10.7 % now. Id.
21. The 1990 census counted 1.4 million Filipinos nationwide. However, a recent
poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times reports "political participation [among
Filipino Americans] is low." K Connie Kang, Filipinos Happy with Life in U.S. but Lack
United Voice, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996, at Al. Out of the 19 candidates in the May 3,
1997 elections, there are six women, two African Americans and one Hispanic but no
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often used as tools by politicians who paint us either as non-victims
of discrimination or as the "model minority." These politicians point
to us as a group that, through a conservative work ethic, has over-
come discrimination and in this manner use us as a reason to be
colorblind and ignore the need for race-consciousness. This Article
also calls upon Asian Americans to support race-conscious diversity
programs as a means of fostering Asian American participation in
society, enabling us to define our own role, and thereby preempting
self-serving politicians' characterization of Asian Americans.
Race-conscious measures are most often associated with af-
firmative action. The term "affirmative action" 22 historically
indicates remedial and backward-looking rationale that have come
to bear a negative connotation, especially in the context of non-
victims of historical discrimination. In contrast, the goal of diver-
sity encompasses a remedial purpose by recognizing the exclusion
of diverse groups and fostering their inclusion in the decision-
making processes. Furthermore, it emphasizes the prospective
benefits of a robust exchange of ideas, increased cultural awareness,
multi-cultural understanding, and racial acceptance. Since the
benefits of diversity serve purposes broader than remedying past
discrimination, the goal of fostering diversity will remain even after
the time when there is no need for remedial action.
The term "diversity program," as opposed to affirmative action,
is used throughout this Article to emphasize the dual rationale em-
bodied in the goal of diversity. The use of the term "diversity"
emphasizes the idea that the benefits of fostering diversity will carry
forward and affect future generations by exposing them to different
perspectives. The goal of diversity extends beyond affirmative action
for so-called racial minorities.24 It fosters greater representation by
Asian Americans, despite the fact that Asian Americans are the fastest growing
segment of Arlington's population. Kim Homer, Few Asians in Local Politics, Experts
Say Lack of Experience, Cultural Differences Cited, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 29,
1997, at 1A. "Many Asians do not participate in politics because they have immigrated
from countries with oppressive political regimes and they do not have experience
dealing with democracies." Id. quoting Muriel Yu, professor at the University of Texas
at Arlington. The negative stereotypes of Asian that have emerged from the recent
controversy over allegations that China tried to influence the U.S. elections, also made
them feel "scapegoated" and leery about entering the political scene. Id.
22. Section 706 of Title VII provides that if a defendant is found to have intention-
ally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice, the
court may "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees ... or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 20 00e-5(g)(1) (1994). This definition
of the term "affirmative action" lacks clarity. Does affirmative action entail the use of
quotas or so-called "reverse discrimination?" This lack of clarity in defining affirma-
tive action reflects the confusion and miscommunication that engulfs this issue.
23. See discussion of the Model Minority Myth infra Part III.A.
24. The use of the term "minority" "belies the numerical significance of the con-
stituencies typically excluded from jurisprudential discourse." Mari J. Matsuda, Public
[VOL. 2:361
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"outsiders" and members of disempowered groups. s This Article
focuses on race-conscious classifications in diversity programs.
Before going further, some preliminary definitions are in order.
Although these concepts will be discussed in more detail later,"' the
terms "diversity" and "diversity program" and their use in this Ar-
ticle deserve attention. Diversity is the quality of being different
from the majority or dominant culture.17 How that difference mani-
fests itself will vary with each individual. Although each person is
unique and in that sense different from the majority, not everyone
can be considered diverse. The question is which differences matter?
Society has treated race and gender as particularly salient differ-
ences. Minorities and women historically have been singled out for
systematic subordination and oppression.2 Diverse individuals are
those whose differences have caused them to experience difficulty in
accessing mainstream America. Disempowered groups and indi-
viduals are the focus of efforts to increase diversity. This Article
focuses on racially diverse individuals and race-conscious classifi-
cations. The issue of which differences are particularly salient to
diversity admissions programs is addressed later.3"
Although efforts to increase diversity are present in many areas
of society, the term "diversity program 1 as used in this article refers
to a program that seeks to diversify a law school's student body by
considering group membership or identity in order to foster the par-
ticipation of racially diverse groups and thereby increase meaningful
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323
n.15 (1989). For this reason, the term "racially diverse" is used in this Article.
25. "Outsider jurisprudence" includes feminist jurisprudence and the jurisprudence
of people of color. Id. at 2323.
26. See infra Part III.
27. In the United States, the current dominant culture is "white" culture. This cul-
ture comprises "mainstream" society. This Article uses the term "dominant culture" to
indicate the dynamic nature of the definition of diversity. The goal of diversity does
not depend upon a particular dominant culture. Regardless of which groups come to
power, there will always be those that are disempowered or underrepresented, and
thus the goal of diversity will remain.
In this Article, I capitalize the terms Asian American, African American, Black,
Hispanic American, and Latino but not "white." This choice emphasizes the unique-
ness of the diverse races. It also emphasizes the diversity of viewpoints among the
various ethnicities as opposed to the dominant culture's largely Western European
view and decries any support of an essentialist reduction to minority v. non-minority
views.
28. See Foster, supra note 9, at 129.
29. Id. Other disempowered groups include the economically disadvantaged and
the physically challenged.
30. See infra Part II.
31. In defining a "diversity program," I found the thoughts of Paul Brest and Mi-
randa Oshige helpful. Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47
STAN. L. REV. 855, 858 (1995). See generally id. at 856 (clarifying their usage of the term
"affirmative action").
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exposure 2 to diverse points of view. Because diversity programs
will vary according to the specific goals of each institution, it is not
possible here to delineate a specific diversity program. However, the
following general thoughts are offered with regard to an ideal di-
versity program. There are three stages to attaining a diverse student
body:
(1) recruiting diverse applicants,
(2) admitting qualified applicants, and
(3) retaining diverse students.
In order to be effective, a diversity program must make a con-
certed effort in all three stages. Institutions which are perceived as
"white" or "hostile to minorities"' have difficulty recruiting diverse
applicants. Absent an admissions program that examines the "whole
person" of each applicant because it recognizes that meritocratic
methods" are not perfect predictors of ability, diverse applicants
may be recruited but may not be admitted. Diverse applicants who
are admitted may choose not to attend an institution that is per-
ceived as "hostile to minorities." An institution can alleviate this
perception by openly supporting diversity and emphasizing the
benefits of the personal characteristic of being diverse. Absent this
open support, there may be a stigma associated with the diversity
program such that those who are matriculated may subsequently
leave. Therefore, a diversity program is one that seeks to diversify a
32. 1 emphasize meaningful exposure to preempt any statement that diversity has
been satisfied by hiring disempowered people to fill the lower ranks of an organiza-
tion and thereby meet a goal of proportional representation. There is no meaningful
exposure when the disempowered are only hired to perform menial tasks where their
ideas do not matter and their thoughts are not heard. Similarly, in the educational
context, there is no meaningful exposure when diverse applicants are admitted to give
the appearance of a diverse student body but their views and input are ignored.
To have the kind of meaningful exposure to different viewpoints from which
we may all benefit, underrepresented groups must be allowed to raise their voices and
be heard at all levels. Proportional representation, or quotas, is not a goal of diversity.
Rather, diversity seeks to foster equal participation.
33. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp 551, 572 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (describing the
detrimental effect of the perceptions of the University of Texas School of Law as a
"white institution" that was "hostile to minorities" on the school's efforts to attain a
diverse student body).
34. It should be noted that what is seen as "meritorious," just as what is seen as a
"difference," is defined by the dominant culture. There was no equity when these
standards were created. The ideas of diverse groups were not sought when these
"meritorious" standards were defined. I state this not as a substantive attack on the
standard notions of "merit," but rather as another example of the lack of participation
that diversity programs seek to rectify. Diversity programs will foster the participation
of diverse groups who can then take part in defining what society as a whole deems
"meritorious." See infra Part II.A. Throughout this Article, I use the phrase "traditional
academic indicators" to refer to what others call "strict meritocratic measures."
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university's student body by being conscious of an individual's race
as it focuses its efforts on the three areas described above. The focus
of this Article is on the use of race-conscious measures at the ad-
missions stage.
Nothing in the above description should be taken to advocate
proportional representation, quotas, or the lowering of standards.
Nor do the above statements support admitting diverse applicants
merely for the educational benefit of students from the dominant
culture. Rather, a diversity program seeks to foster participation of
diverse groups, cultivate diverse leaders, and promote the meaning-
ful exchange of diverse views for the benefit of all parties. A
diversity program may include various measures at each of the three
stages described above including aggressive recruitment of diverse
applicants, scholarships targeted at disempowered groups, encour-
agement of student groups on campus to represent the interests and
needs of the different groups,3 and considering community ties as a
plus factor in the admissions process. However, without the use of
race-conscious measures at the admissions stage, efforts at other
stages are for naught.
Part I argues that diversity is a compelling interest and that a
narrowly drawn diversity program will survive strict scrutiny. Part I
also provides background on the development of the diversity con-
cept in the Court's opinions in Bakke and Metro Broadcasting and the
evolution of the strict scrutiny test for race-conscious classifications
in Supreme Court cases, paying special attention to the Court's re-
cent decision in Adarand. Part I also argues that the Court has left
room for the diversity rationale to be considered a compelling state
interest capable of surviving strict scrutiny. Part II defines the ideal
diversity admissions program and addresses three issues to which
diversity programs should give special attention: 1) emphasis on the
whole person; 2) inclusion of race as an essential element of any
definition of an individual's diversity; and 3) alleviation of any
stigma diversity programs may introduce. Part III discusses the in-
clusion of various Asian ethnicities in diversity admissions
programs and encourages Asian Americans to support diversity
programs.
35. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION: INFORMATION ON MINORITY-
TARGETED SCHOLARSHIPS at 10 (1994).
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I. THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RACE-
CONSCIOUS DIVERSITY PROGRAMS
A. Historical Overview of Race-Conscious Measures and the Evolution of
the Diversity Concept: Bakke to Adarand
1. The Evolution of the Diversity Concept
a. Bakke
In 1978, the first major case dealing with race-conscious classifi-
cations came before the Burger Court when it addressed an
admissions program designed to benefit groups that have suffered
discrimination in our society. In Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,36 a white male medical school applicant challenged the
constitutionality of the admissions program for the University of
California at Davis Medical School, a state-run school. Davis' ad-
missions program reserved a number of spaces in its entering class
for minority students. The special admissions program operated
with a special conunittee, a majority of whom were minorities.& The
1973 application asked applicants to indicate whether they were
economically and/or educationally disadvantaged without provid-
ing a formal definition of the term "disadvantaged." 39 The 1974
application form asked applicants whether they desired to be con-
sidered members of a minority group.40 Applications which
contained affirmative answers to these questions were forwarded to
the special admissions committee.41 The chairman of the special
committee screened each application to see whether it reflected
"economic or educational deprivation." 42 These special applicants
were not required to meet the 2.5 grade point minimum that applied
to other candidates.43 The special committee assigned each special
applicant a benchmark score and presented its top choices to the
general admissions committee; the special committee continued to
36. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
37. Id. at 275.
38. Id. at 274.
39. Id. at 274-75.
40. Id. at 274.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 275. In examining the application for evidence of the applicant's economic
or educational deprivation, the chairman noted, among other things, whether "the
applicant had been granted a waiver of the school's application fee, which required a
means test; whether applicant had worked during college or interrupted his education
to support himself or his family, and whether the applicant was a member of a minor-
ity group." Id. at 275 n.4.
43. Id. at 275.
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recommend special applicants until a number prescribed by faculty
vote were admitted."' The general admissions committee did not rate
or compare the special applicants with the general applicants, but
could reject recommended special applicants for specific deficiencies
including failure to meet course requirements.
4
1
Alan Bakke, a rejected white male applicant, applied to Davis
Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. In both years he had better
paper credentials than some minority admires.4 After the second
rejection, Bakke filed suit challenging the special admissions pro-
gram as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.47 On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the University of California Regents, as petition-
ers, argued that "strict scrutiny" should only apply to
"classifications that disadvantage 'discrete and insular minori-
ties.' "" Four Justices, led by Justice Brennan, agreed with the
university and ruled that the appropriate standard was intermediate
scrutiny, not strict scrutiny.49 These four Justices ruled that any dis-
crimination in Davis' admissions policy was benign because it was
designed to remedy past discrimination and did not disadvantage
discrete and insular minorities and, therefore, Davis' special admis-
sions program satisfied intermediate scrutiny and was
constitutional."0
Four Justices, led by Justice Stevens, ruled in Bakke's favor on
statutory grounds, without reaching the constitutional question."
Justice Stevens continued that it was not necessary to consider
whether Davis' admissions program violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it violated section 601
of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 which clearly prohibits "the exclu-
sion of 'any' individual from a federally funded program on the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Justice Powell's opinion, citing the trial court's record for a comparison of
Bakke's "traditional criteria" with an average of special admires' "traditional criteria,"
states that "[iun both years, applicants were admitted under the special program with
grade point averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower than
Bakke's." Id. at 277.
47. Id. at 277-78.
48. Id. at 287-88 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938)).
49. Id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). These four Justices concluded that "racial
classifications designed to further remedial purposes 'must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.' "Id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)(emphasis added))).
50. Id. at 368-79.
51. Id. at 411-12, 421 (Stevens, J., with whom Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.
join, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
SPRING 1997]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
ground of race"5'3 even if the exclusion does not carry with it a racial
stigma.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, announcing the Court's
judgment, rejected the Regents' argument that strict scrutiny should
only apply to classifications that disadvantage discrete and insular
minorities and cast the decisive vote in favor of Bakke. Justice
Powell, however, did not state that all race-conscious classifications
were unconstitutional, but rather, set two acceptable justifications
for race-conscious classifications: 1) remedying the disabling effects
of identified discrimination and 2) creating diversity in the student
body.55 Nevertheless, Justice Powell, applying strict scrutiny, found
that the Regents failed to prove that Davis' special admissions pro-
gram was necessary to further either of these substantial state
interests.'
Justice Powell stated that the medical school's goal of
"reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities
in medical schools and in the medical profession, ' 7 was akin to at-
tempting to remedy societal discrimination rather than specific
instances of discriination." Justice Powell further stated that the
Regents' "broad mission is education, not the formulation of any
legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegal-
ity" 9 and as such, the Regents are in no position to make judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations.6° Because there were no findings of constitutional or
statutory violations (i.e., no "identified discrimination"), Justice
Powell ruled that the Regents failed to carry the burden of justifica-
tion for this rationale.61
With regard to the university's goal of fostering diversity,
Justice Powell held that the Regents failed to prove that the
university's race-based classification was necessary to promote the
interest of diversity.62 Justice Powell stated that "when a State's
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 413.
54. Id. at 414. Justice Stevens' opinion also stated that "the question whether race
can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case" be-
cause the trial court's order did not include any "broad prohibition against any use of
race in the admissions process .... Id. at 409-11.
55. Id. at 307, 311-13.
56. Although Justice Powell's decision uses the term "substantial interests," the sum
of his opinion makes it clear that Justice Powell applied a strict scrutiny test and took
the position that both of these goals would satisfy strict scrutiny.
57. Id. at 306 (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 307-09.
59. Id. at 309.
60. Id.
61. Id. at310.
62. Id. at 320.
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distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges" on race, the
State must prove that such a "classification is necessary to promote a
substantial state interest."' Additionally, "the diversity that furthers
a compelling state interest encompasses a [broad] array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is
but a single though important element."" Although Justice Powell
ruled against the Davis program, he did declare that educational
diversity may be legitimately served by a "properly devised
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race
and ethnic origin. '
Justice Powell's opinion employs the first two parts of a race-
conscious perspective as earlier defined. 6  First, Justice Powell made
clear that considering race as a plus is acceptable in the educational
context. In acknowledging that race is an important element of the
compelling interest of diversity, Justice Powell recognized the social
reality of race. Justice Powell addressed the internal effects of race
when he stated that "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment
and creation'-so essential to the quality of higher education-is
widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. 6 7 Sec-
ond, in striking down the Davis admissions program that used race
as the sole criteria for preferring certain applicants, Justice Powell
promotes a decision-making processes where race is an important
factor, but not the only one.
b. Metro Broadcasting
The Court addressed affirmative action in the federal context
and the diversity rationale in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.6" Metro
Broadcasting considered the constitutionality of the Federal Com-
munications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") minority69
preference policies. The FCC had two programs which were de-
signed to increase broadcast diversity by rewarding minority
63. Id. (emphasis added). Given that Justice Powell's opinion found diversity to be
a compelling state interest and therefore an acceptable justification for race-conscious
classifications, this finding presumably focuses on the fact that Davis' program was
race-based, as opposed to race-conscious.
64. Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 320.
66. See supra note 3.
67. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 (citing Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race,
PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY. 7, 9 (Sept. 26, 1977)).
68. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
69. The FCC defined "minority" as including "those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed,
American Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction." Id. at
553 n.1 (quoting Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979, 980 n.8 (1978)).
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ownership and participation in management of broadcast licenses."
The first of these programs focused on minority procurement of new
licenses. When the Commission held a comparative hearing to com-
pare mutually exclusive (technologically incompatible) applications
for new radio or television stations, it considered minority owner-
ship and participation in management a "plus" to be weighed
together with all other relevant factors.7 ' The second program, the
"distress sale" policy, increased minority opportunities to receive
reassigned and transferred licenses. When a radio or television
broadcaster was designated for a revocation hearing, or their re-
newal application was designated for hearing, the "distress sale"
policy allowed that broadcaster to assign the license to an FCC-
approved minority enterprise.2
The Court's opinion, delivered by Justice Brennan, held that
broadcast diversity is, "at the very least, an important governmental
objective"73 and a justification for federal race-conscious classifica-
tions. The Court noted that the FCC and Congress had both
forward- and backward-looking justifications for these programs.
The Court stated:
Congress found that "the effects of past inequities stem-
ming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted
in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media
of mass communication." Congress and the Commission
do not justify the minority ownership policies strictly as
remedies for victims of this discrimination, however.
Rather, Congress and the FCC have selected the minority
ownership policies primarily to promote programming di-
versity, and they urge that such diversity is an important
governmental objective that can serve as a constitutional
basis for the preference policies. We agree.74
The Court accepted a diversity program with both backward
and forward-looking rationales.
The Court applied a race-conscious perspective when it ac-
cepted the FCC's rationales. In recognizing that the backward-
70. Although at the time of this writing, the Court's recent decision in Adarand has
partially overruled Metro Broadcasting, Adarand only addresses the standard of scru-
tiny and does not address the FCC's policies. The specific policies addressed in Metro
Broadcasting still exist today. See Text of "Affirmative Action Review" Report to Presi-
dent Clinton Released July 19, 1995, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 139 d30 (July 20,
1995).
71. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 557.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 566 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-765, at 43 (1982)).
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looking portion of the FCC's rationale was premised on a congres-
sional finding that the present underrepresentation of minorities
stemmed from past discrimination in the field of mass communica-
tion, the Court acknowledged that racially diverse individuals are
often judged on the color of their skin and treated differently be-
cause of their race. Similarly, in accepting the forward-looking
portion of the FCC's rationale, the Court applied a race-conscious
perspective recognizing the internal effect of race and acknowledg-
ing that racially diverse individuals will have a different perspective
because of their race. The majority was careful to reject the notion
that it was employing impermissible stereotypes in accepting the
internal effect of race:
The predictive judgment about the overall result of minor-
ity entry into broadcasting is not a rigid assumption about
how minority owners will behave in every case but rather
is akin to Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that greater
admission of minorities would contribute, on the average,
to the "robust exchange of ideas." To be sure, there is no
ironclad guarantee that each minority owner will contrib-
ute to diversity [of views]. But neither was there the
assurance in Bakke that minority students would interact
with non-minority students or that the particular minority
students admitted would have typical or distinct
"minority" viewpoints.75
The Court recognized that not all racial minorities will exhibit
viewpoints different from the dominant culture. It is sufficient that a
racially diverse broadcasting industry will produce "more variation
and diversity than will one whose ownership is drawn from a single
racially and ethnically homogeneous group."76
The Court stated that "it is axiomatic that broadcasting may be
regulated in light of the First Amendment rights of the viewing and
listening audience and that 'the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public.' "77' "Safeguarding the public's right to receive
a diversity of views and information over the airwaves is therefore
an integral component of the FCC's mission."78 The Court upheld
the FCC's policies and practices designed to increase the ownership
of broadcast enterprises by racial minorities, stating that "[t]he
Commission's minority ownership policies bear the imprimatur of
75. Id. at 579-80 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312).
76. Id. at 579.
77. Id. at 567 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
78. Id.
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long-standing congressional support and direction and are substan-
tially related to the achievement of the important governmental
objective of broadcast diversity."79
Because the Court applied an intermediate standard of scrutiny
in Metro Broadcasting, and declared that broadcast diversity is an
"important governmental objective," it is not clear whether broad-
cast diversity would also be considered a compelling interest and
pass muster under a strict scrutiny review as established in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.8"
2. The Evolution of the Strict Scrutiny Test and Adarand's
Implications for Diversity
The issue of the proper standard of review for racial classifica-
tions was raised two years after Bakke, when the Court addressed a
challenge to remedial race-conscious action on the federal level in
Fullilove v. Klutznick.81 Chief Justice Burger's opinion, announcing
the judgment of the Court, observed that "[any preference based on
racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching
examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitu-
tional guarantees."82 However, Chief Justice Burger's opinion did
not "adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis
articulated in such cases as, Bakke"' or any other traditional stan-
dard of equal protection review, but rather, formulated a two-part
test based on a distinction between the powers of Congress and the
79. Id. at 600.
80. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). However, in his dissenting opinion in Adarand, Justice
Stevens stated that "ithe proposition that fostering diversity may provide a sufficient
interest to justify [a diversity program] is not inconsistent with the Court's holding
today-indeed, the question is not remotely presented in this case-and I do not take
the Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our decision in Metro Broadcasting." Id.
at 2127-28. Justice Stevens' dissent is discussed further infra notes 112-115.
81. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding the 10% set-aside for minority-owned businesses
that Congress included in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977).
82. Id. at491.
83. Id. at 492. Chief Justice Burger's opinion did state that "the [Minority Business
Enterprise] provision [of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977] would survive
judicial review under either 'test' articulated in the several Bakke opinions." Id. Chief
Justice Burger's decision not to adopt strict scrutiny as outlined by Justice Powell in
Bakke should not be seen as diminishing Bakke. "Chief Justice Burger's noncategorical
approach is probably best seen not as more lenient than strict scrutiny but as reflecting
his conviction that the treble-tiered scrutiny structure merely embroidered on a single
standard of reasonableness whenever an equal protection challenge required a balanc-
ing of justification against probable harm." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2132 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J.))
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powers of the states. Chief Justice Burger's opinion upheld the
program on the ground that Congress, more than any other state or
federal government organ, has broad and comprehensive remedial
power with which it may remedy past societal discrimination and
enforce equal protection guarantees."5 Just as in Bakke, the Court's
decision in Fullilove did not contain a majority opinion. The Court
left the issue of the proper standard for race-conscious measures un-
resolved.
For the next nine years after Fullilove, the Court was unable to
concretely define the standard of scrutiny to be used for state and
local governments' race-conscious classifications.86 The lower courts
were left floundering. 7 In 1989, the Court finally resolved the issue
84. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473. The two part test first asked "whether the objectives of
[the] legislation are within the power of Congress," and second asked "whether the
limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally
permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives and does not violate the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
85. Id. at 483-84. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell argued that the plurality
had essentially applied strict scrutiny as described in Bakke even though the plurality
opinion chose not to articulate which standard it used. Id. at 495-96.
86. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Court held that a collective bargain-
ing agreement which protected recently hired minority teachers against layoffs in a
state-run school was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly drawn to further
the compelling state interest of remedying past discrimination. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
However, the Court was unable to form a majority opinion as to the proper standard
of scrutiny to be applied to race-conscious measures. Justice Powell's opinion, in
which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined, applied strict
scrutiny. Id. at 274. Justice White, voting with the plurality, chose not to address the
issue of a proper standard of review. Id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l. Ass 'n v. EEOC, the Court upheld a
race-conscious remedy against a union that had been found guilty of racial discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII, but, once again, the Court did not define the proper
standard of review. 478 U.S. 421 (1986). Part V of Justice Brennan's opinion, in which
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined, states: "[w]e have not agreed . . . on
the proper test to be applied in analyzing the constitutionality of race-conscious re-
medial measures .... We need not resolve this dispute here, since we conclude that
the relief ordered in this case passes even the most rigorous test . Id. at 480
(citations omitted).
In United States v. Paradise, the Court upheld a 1972 federal district court order
that required half of the Alabama Department of Public Safety's subsequent promo-
tions to be awarded to African Americans as a remedy for blatant discrimination. 480
U.S. 149 (1987). Justice Brennan's opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Powell joined, states: "[A]lthough this Court has consistently held that some elevated
level of scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic distinction is made for remedial
purposes, it has yet to reach consensus on the appropriate constitutional analysis. We
need not do so in this case, however, because we conclude that the relief ordered sur-
vives even strict scrutiny analysis .... Id. at 166-67 (footnote omitted).
87. See, e.g., Kromnick v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1984)
("The absence of an Opinion of the Court in either Bakke or Fullilove and the concomi-
tant failure of the Court to articulate an analytic framework supporting the judgments
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for state and local governments when it applied strict scrutiny in
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co." In Croson, the Court applied strict scru-
tiny to the City of Richmond's ordinance, a minority business
utilization "set-aside" plan, and held that it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause. justice O'Connor's opinion,
speaking for a majority of the Court, held that "the standard of re-
view under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race
of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification," 89
rather, strict scrutiny applies to all race-conscious measures adopted
by the states.90 The Court's primary objection to the Richmond set-
aside was its arbitrariness.9' Justice O'Connor's opinion stated that
the "random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter,
may never have suffered from discrimination in the construction
industry in Richmond suggests that perhaps the city's purpose was
not in fact to remedy past discrimination."9 2 Nevertheless, part III-B
of Justice O'Connor's opinion, speaking for five Justices, suggests
that a more carefully crafted set-aside plan may pass constitutional
muster.93
Although Croson alleviated some confusion by determining that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all state and
local government race-conscious actions, Croson did not address the
standard of review required by the Fifth Amendment for the federal
government's race-conscious actions.94 In using an intermediate
makes the position of the lower federal courts considering the constitutionality of af-
firmative action programs somewhat vulnerable."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985).
88. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The case has six separate opinions. Justice O'Connor's
opinion (in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Kennedy and Stevens
joined as to Parts I, Ill-B, and IV) constituted the opinion of the Court. Justices Stevens
and Kennedy each filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Marshall filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined. Justice Blackmun
filed a separate dissent, joined by Justice Brennan.
89. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., writing for a four-Justice plurality of the Court holding
that strict scrutiny applies to all government classifications by race) (citing Wygant,
476 U.S. at 279-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in judgment)). Although this
part of Justice O'Connor's opinion carried the weight of only four justices, Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion also expressed the view that strict scrutiny is to be applied
to all governmental classifications by race. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 493.
91. Id. at 498-506.
92. Id. at 506.
93. See id. at 503 (noting that fine-tuned statistical analysis indicating a large differ-
ence between eligible Minority Business Enterprises and actual Minority Business
Enterprise membership could give rise to an inference of discriminatory exclusion,
thereby creating a compelling interest).
94. See, e.g., Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 959 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) ("Croson certainly did not resolve the substantial questions posed by con-
gressional programs which mandate the use of racial preferences."); Winter Park
Communication, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The unresolved am-
biguity of Fullilove and Croson leaves it impossible to reach a firm opinion as to the
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scrutiny approach, Metro Broadcasting created an inconsistency re-
garding the appropriate standard of review for federal, as opposed
to state, race-conscious classifications. After Metro Broadcasting,
courts applied different standards of judicial review for governmen-
tal race-conscious actions depending on whether federal or state
government action was at issue. The line was clearly drawn for state
government action; if state government action was at issue, strict
scrutiny applied. However, when federal government action was
involved, intermediate scrutiny applied if the program in question
was for "benign" purposes, but strict scrutiny applied if the program
in question was not for a benign or remedial purpose. The Court re-
cently eliminated all this inconsistency by ruling that the
appropriate standard of scrutiny to be applied to all race-conscious
actions, whether state or federal, is strict scrutiny. s
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena96 involved a contract that came
about as a result of the Surface Transportation and Uniform
Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 ("STURAA").9 Section 106(c)(1) of
STURAA provided that "not less than 10 percent" of the
appropriated funds "shall be expended with small business
concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals."" The Court held "that all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny."' Clarifying its holding, the Court stated: "In other
words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
evidence of discrimination needed to sustain a congressional mandate of racial prefer-
ences."), aff'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
95. Although some may mourn the death of intermediate scrutiny for benign race-
conscious classifications, and perhaps with good cause, some comfort may be taken in
the fact that the lines have finally been drawn with some clarity. We need no longer
worry what standard the Court will apply. Now the task is to define diversity pro-
grams that will meet this standard.
96. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
97. Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 145.
98. 101 Stat. at 145. STURAA adopts the definition of "socially and economically
disadvantaged individual" found in the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637 which
defines "socially disadvantaged individuals" as "those who have been subjected to
racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a
group without regard to their individual qualities," 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5), and
"economically disadvantaged individuals" as "those socially disadvantaged individu-
als whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to
diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same busi-
ness area who are not socially disadvantaged." 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A). STURAA also
adds that "women shall be presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals for purposes of this subsection." § 106(c)(2)(B), 101 Stat. at 146.
99. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
SPRING 1997]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
interests."'00 To the extent that Metro Broadcastin allowed varying
standards of review, Adarand overruled that case.
Justice O'Connor, announcing the judgment of the Court,
stated that, by adopting intermediate scrutiny as the standard of re-
view for congressionally mandated "benign" racial classifications in
Metro Broadcasting, the Court departed from prior cases in two ways:
by turning its back on Croson and by undermining propositions laid
out in previous cases.0 2 Justice O'Connor explained:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for
such race-based measures, there is simply no way of de-
termining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial"
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegiti-
mate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.
Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" il-
legitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body
is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means
chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is lit-
tle or no possibility that the motive for the classification
was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
10 3
Justice O'Connor went on to state that "despite the surface ap-
peal of holding 'benign' racial classifications to a lower standard,"
the Court's decision in Adarand would uphold the view expressed in
Croson because "it may not always be clear that a so-called prefer-
ence is in fact benign. ,104
Justice O'Connor also stated that Metro Broadcasting rejected the
proposition of "congruence between the standards applicable to fed-
eral and state racial classifications" and in so doing undermined the
propositions of "skepticism of all racial classifications, and consis-
tency of treatment irrespective of the race of the burdened or
benefited group" that previous decisions established.0'
100. Id.
101. See id. at 2112-13.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2112 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.)).
104. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
105. Id. Earlier in her decision, Justice O'Connor identified three principles that the
Court's cases through Croson had established with respect to governmental racial
classifications: skepticism, consistency, and congruence. "Taken together, these
propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of whatever race, has the right to
demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial
scrutiny." Id. at 2111.
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The three propositions undermined by Metro Broadcasting
all derive from the basic principle that the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not
groups. It follows from that principle that all governmental
action based on race-a group classification long recog-
nized as 'in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
prohibited,'-should be subjected to detailed judicial in-
quiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of
the laws has not been infringed.
10 6
The Court adopted a strict scrutiny test in order to protect the
personal rights of individuals, regardless of their race, and to ensure
that "government may treat people differently because of their race
only for the most compelling reasons."' 7 Although Justices Scalia
and Thomas, in their concurrences, expressed the view that there
can never be a "compelling interest" to justify the government use of
a race-conscious classification, 108 Justice O'Connor made clear that
the Court "wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict
in theory, but fatal in fact.' "109 Justice O'Connor noted that "[tihe
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting
in response to it,"'11 and she stated that "[w]hen race-conscious ac-
tion is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is
within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring'
test this Court has set out in previous cases.''
Even though Adarand provides that strict scrutiny applies to all
governmental race-conscious classifications, the decision does not
address diversity as a compelling interest. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Stevens points out that Metro Broadcasting's holding did not
turn on its application of "intermediate scrutiny.""' 2 "Indeed, I have
always believed that . . . the FCC program we upheld in [Metro
Broadcasting] would have satisfied any of our various standards in
affirmative-action cases-including the one the majority fashions
today.""13 Justice Stevens differentiated Metro Broadcasting from
previous cases stating that "[w]hat truly distinguishes Metro
Broadcasting from our other affirmative-action precedents is the
106. Id. at 2112-13 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at2113.
108. Id. at 2118-19.
109. Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
110. Id.
ill. Id.
112. Id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
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distinctive goal of the federal program in that case. Instead of merely seeking
to remedy past discrimination, the FCC program was intended to achieve
fidure benei in the form of broadcast diversity.'"1 4 Regarding Adarand's
effect on this "distinctive goal" of achieving future benefits through
diversity, Justice Stevens states that "the proposition that fostering diversity
may provide a sufficient interest to justify [a diversity] program is not
inconsistent with the Court's holding today--indeed, the question is not
remotely presented in this case--and I do not take the Court's opinion to
diminish that aspect of our decision in Metro Broadcasting."'1 s
This reasoning should bear even greater weight for the goal of attain-
ing a diverse student body.
B. Diversity as a Compelling Interest16
The purpose of this Article is not to criticize nor support the
strict scrutiny test for race-based classifications. Rather, this Article
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 2127-28.
116. A note regarding jurisdiction over private universities is required. Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits schools that receive federal funding from dis-
criminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
Title VI regulations issued by the Department of Education prohibit recipients of fed-
eral funding from "utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or na-
tional origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect to [sic] individuals of a
particular race, color, or national origin." 34 C.F.R § 100.3(b)(2) (1987). In 1988, Con-
gress amended the "program or activity" language of Title VI to "mean all of the
operations of... a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public
system of higher education." Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259,
§ 3, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). Because a private university's admissions practices are part of
its "operations," Title VI applies to the admissions practices of private universities that
receive federal funds. Therefore, private schools that receive federal funding most
likely must adhere to Title VI.
It is unclear whether private institutions will be held to the strict scrutiny stan-
dard set by Adarand. Such a determination would require application of the state
action doctrine. "There is no formal test for the amount of contacts with government
which will subject a private person's activities to the restrictions of the Constitution."
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.3, at 463 (4th ed.
1991). The Court has stated that determining whether state action exists must be done
on a case by case basis. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715, 722 (1961). It is unclear whether indirect federal assistance in the form of tuition
paid by student loans would be sufficient to require private institutions to be subject to
strict scrutiny. See Lisa P. Baar, The Higher Education Amendments of 1992: Resolving the
Conflict over Diversity Standards and Institutional Eligibility for Title IV Aid, 30 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 253, 285-89 (stating that the constitutionality of students' use of federal
grants and loans, like those disbursed under Title IV, to attend religiously affiliated
institutions is an open question but that cases suggest that such use would not violate
the Establishment Clause). However, to be on the safe side, private institutions should
create diversity admissions programs that would meet constitutional muster.
Race-Conscious Diversity
advocates the creation of race-conscious diversity programs and
takes the position that educational institutions must understand the
status of the law and draft race-conscious diversity programs that fit
within it. A diversity program that utilizes race-conscious measures
will be constitutional if it passes the two prongs of the strict scrutiny
test, in other words, if it 1) furthers a compelling interest and 2) is
narrowly tailored.
1. The Effect of Hopwood on the Concept of Diversity as a
Compelling Interest
A university's interest in attaining a diverse student body was
first endorsed as a compelling interest in Bakke where Justice Powell
stated, "the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a
university's admissions program .... nT[I1t is not too much to say
that the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Na-
tion of many peoples.""" The need for an environment which would
foster a "robust exchange of ideas" makes the goal of diversity "of
paramount importance in the fulfillment of [a university's] mis-
sion. This is especially true in the law school environment.20
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and
practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the indi-
viduals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few
students and no one who has practiced law would choose
to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the inter-
play of ideas and the exchange of views with which the
law is concerned.
Despite the Supreme Court precedents in this area, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeal has recently decided that the use of race as a
factor by the University of Texas School of Law ("UT" or "the law
school") for the purpose of diversity was per se unconstitutional. 22
The following discussion addresses the impact of the Hopwood deci-
sion upon drafters of diversity admissions programs.
117 438 U.S. at313.
118. Id.; see also Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571 ("[O]btaining the educa-
tional benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse student body remains s
sufficiently compelling interest to support the use of racial classifications.").
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
121. Id.
122. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
SPRING 1997]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 2:361
In Hopwood v. Texas, four rejected non-minority applicants123
challenged UT's 1992 admissions program alleging violations of
equal protection.'24 UT's 1992 admissions program, consisted of two
tiers: an admissions committee comprised of nine professors, two
assistant deans, and four students; and a minority subconunittee
comprised of three members of the admissions committee. Upon
receiving an application, the school color-coded it based on the ap-
plicant's Texas residency status and the applicant's race or
ethnicity.Y The race or ethnicity classification was divided into
Black/African American, Native American, Asian American, Mexi-
can American, Other Hispanic, white, or Other.127 Each applicant
was assigned a Texas Index number ("TI"), as calculated by the Law
School Data Assembly Service ("LSDAS"), which reflected the appli-
cant's GPA and LSAT score.28 Once an initial determination of the
quantity and Texas Index numbers of the applicant pool was made,
Professor Johanson drew initial presumptive admission and pre-
sumptive denial lines based on the TI's and created three zones:
presumptive admit, presumptive denial, and discretionary.!"
Committee members reviewing the files in the discretionary zone
placed less emphasis on the applicant's numbers and instead care-
fully reviewed the applicant's qualifications as reflected in the
applicant's entire file.
123. The plaintiffs were Cheryl Hopwood, a white female, and three white males,
Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliott, and David Rogers. Id. at 937-38.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 937. Professor Johanson, a member of this minority subcommittee, was
also the chair of the admission's committee. Id.
126. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp at 560. The district court's opinion points out that pre-
sumptive denial and admit lines were drawn higher for nonresident applicants. Id. at
561 n.22. Judge Smith's opinion neglects to mention that the applicant files were also
color-coded according to Texas residency. 78 F.3d at 937.
127. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 n.4.
128. Id. at 935.
129. Id.; Hopwood, 861 F. Supp at 560-61. "Those applicants with a high TI reflect a
high LSAT and high grades in a rigorous major at a leading undergraduate institution
were admitted by Johanson, who had unilateral authority to admit any applicant in
this category without further consultation with the full admissions committee." Id. at
561. Applicants whose TI's fell above the presumptive admission line but were
"inflated by high grades in a noncompetitive major or at a "weak school" or if there
was some other "questionable feature of [their] file" were placed into a discretionary
category. Id. The files of applicants whose TI fell below the presumptive denial line
were reviewed by one or two members of the admissions committee to determine if
the "TI adequately reflected the applicant's likelihood of success in law school or
competitive standing relative to the entire applicant pool." Id. "[Als a result of this
review [some] files were upgraded.., to the discretionary zone." Id. In addition to the
applicants whose files were moved from one of the other zones, the discretionary zone
was comprised of "those applicants whose TI's fell between the presumptive denial
line and presumptive admission lines." Id.
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The standards UT used to assess applicants differed based on
race and national origin in two ways. 13' First, Johanson's determina-
tion of the presumptive admission and denial TIs varied between
non-minorities and minorities, so that the presumptive denial score
for non-minorities was higher than the presumptive admission score
for minorities."' Second, the admissions committee had different
procedures for reviewing non-minority and minority files in the dis-
cretionary zone.'32 Non-minority files were divided into stacks of
thirty which were reviewed by three members of the admissions
committee.133 A minority subcommittee reviewed all the minority
files."4 Each member of the minority subcommittee was to be part of
the three-person subcommittees that reviewed the non-minority
files. Instead of each minority subcommittee member performing
an individual review, as was the procedure for the non-minority
files, the minority subcommittee met as a group and reviewed each
minority applicant's file. The members of the minority subcommit-
tee attended the meetings of the full committee and provided a
summary of the files the subcommittee believed to be good appli-
cants for admission, 37 however the subcommittee's decisions on
individual minority applicants were virtually final .
130. The district court decision in Hopwood and the subsequent appeal conflict as to
the compositions of the minority and non-minority groups and the manner in which
these groups' admissions files were treated. Judge Smith's circuit court opinion states
that only African Americans and Mexican Americans received the benefit of a sepa-
rate admissions track Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 n.4. However, the district court opinion
merely states that the presumptive admit and denial lines were drawn differently for
African American and Mexican American applicants. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 562.
It is unclear how other diverse applicants were grouped, either with the non-
minorities or with the African American and Mexican American applicants, for pur-
poses of 1) presumptive admit and denial determination and 2) discretionary zone
review procedures. However, I submit that the fact that there was no comparison
between minority and non-minority files, as opposed to the exact composition of the
groups, was the critical flaw in UT's diversity admissions program.
131. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936.
132. Id. at 937.
133. Id. at 936. Committee members were required to screen five stacks but no one
person reviewed all the files in the discretionary zone. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 562.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Student members of the subcommittee attended the meetings but were not
voting members of the subcommittee. Id. at n.30.
137. Id. at 562.
138. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 937. The law school's 1992 program differed from the
ideal diversity program because, in addition to the goal of diversity, the law school's
1992 program was designed to remedy proven past discrimination. This fact becomes
relevant when discussing the remedy's numerical goals and the percentage of minori-
ties in the relevant population, the third factor in determining whether a race-
conscious measure is narrowly tailored. See infra Part II.C.l.c.
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Judge Smith, announcing the majority opinion of the three
judge panel,139 held that "any consideration of race or ethnicity by the
law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is
not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
14
1
Judge Smith supported this position with the following rationale: 1)
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke garnered only his own vote and
therefore "is not binding precedent" on the issue of diversity as a
compelling interest; 2) subsequent Supreme Court decisions regard-
ing education state that only remedial state interests will justify
racial classifications; and 3) the "classification of persons on the ba-
sis of race for the purpose of diversity frustrates, rather than
facilitates, the goals of equal protection."'' These rationales are
flawed.
To support his argument that Bakke lacks precedential value,
Judge Smith points out that no other Justices joined in Justice
Powell's "lonely" opinion. 4' Judge Smith also states that the four-
Justice opinion which would have upheld the special admissions
program under intermediate scrutiny "implicitly rejected Justice
Powell's position.' 43 While it is true that no other Justices joined in
Justice Powell opinion that educational diversity is a compelling
interest, any special admissions program that satisfies Justice
Powell's standard would be approved by a majority of the Bakke
Court. Therefore, Justice Powell's opinion is tantamount to an
opinion by the Court.44 Moreover, the majority opinion in Metro
Broadcasting which upheld broadcast diversity as a compelling
interest was comprised of Justice Stevens and the same four Justices
who Judge Smith claims "implicitly rejected Justice Powell's
opinion."' 5 Justice Powell's opinion that diversity is a compelling
139. The case was heard before Circuit Judges Smith, Wiener, and DeMoss. Judge
Wiener entered a special concurrence which concluded that the law school's program
was unconstitutional. However, Judge Weiner disagreed with the other judges' de-
termination that diversity could never be a compelling interest. Id. at 962.
140. Id. at 944 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 944 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.1) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. See Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67
CAL. L. REV. 21, 23 (1979); see also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 964 n.18 (Wiener, J., concur-
ring) ("[Wlhen and if the Supreme Court addresses this case or its analog, the Court
will have no choice but to go with, over, around, or through Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion.").
145. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 457, 457 (1990). Although the inter-
ests of broadcast diversity and educational diversity are distinct and separate from
one another, the majority in Metro Broadcasting can be inferred to have supported edu-
cational diversity had that been the issue in that case, even under a strict scrutiny
analysis. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2097, 2127-28 (1995)
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interest is not as lonely as Judge Smith would tend to believe.
Absent a specific ruling from the Supreme Court to the contrary,
Bakke is still good law which all lower courts must follow.
146
Judge Smith states that "[nlo case since Bakke has accepted
[educational] diversity as a compelling state interest under a strict
scrutiny analysis.' 47 Judge Smith has interpreted this lack of a de-
finitive statement from the Court as suggesting that diversity does
not constitute a compelling interest. However, the reason no case
has affirmed educational diversity as a compelling interest is only
because the issue has not yet come before the Court. After Bakke,
case law has merely decided the proper standard of review for race-
conscious classifications. Judge Smith points to Adarand as calling
Bakke into question. 49 However, Adarand did not question the prece-
dential value of Bakke, instead addressing only Bakke's expression of
a proper standard of review. 50 Even the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in Hopwood' does not suggest that diversity is not a com-
pelling state interest. The Supreme Court's refusal to hear the case
for lack of a live controversy'52 cannot not be interpreted as an en-
dorsement of Judge Smith's analysis."3 Moreover, even if the
existing case law suggests otherwise, Judge Smith's position is
merel an extension of recent Supreme Court precedent and not the
law.'
Finally, Judge Smith states that "[d]iversity fosters, rather than
minimizes, the use of race" and that case law has "sufficiently es-
tablished that the use of [race] simply to achieve racial
heterogeneity, even as part of the consideration of a number of fac-
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe proposition that fostering diversity may [be a compel-
ling interest] is not inconsistent with the Court's holding today.., and I do not take
the Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our decision in Metro Broadcasting.").
146. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 963 (Wiener, J., concurring) ("[I1f Bakke is to be de-
clared dead, the Supreme Court, not a three-judge panel of a circuit court, should
make that pronouncement.").
147. Id. at 944.
148. Id. at 944-45.
149. Id. at 944 (citing Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109).
150. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097. Additionally, as Judge Wiener points out in his dis-
senting opinion, the full quote questions Bakke and its progeny regarding the proper
test.
151. Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
152. Justice Ginsburg's opinion, in which Justice Souter joined, notes that the peti-
tion for certiorari does not challenge the lower courts' judgment that UT's 1992
admissions program was unconstitutional. Id. at 2581. Justice Ginsburg noted that the
petitioners acknowledged that UT's 1992 admissions program was discontinued and
that the petition solely presented a challenge to Judge Smith's rationale. Id.
"Accordingly, we must await a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy
before addressing the important question raised in this petition." Id.
153. See Affirmative Action Confusion, L.A. DAILY J., July 8, 1996, at 6.
154. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 963 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
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tors, is unconstitutional."'55 However, the Supreme Court has not
declared the use of race as a criterion for determining diversity to be
unconstitutional. On the contrary, Justice O'Connor has expressly
stated that Adarand's adoption of the strict scrutiny test does not in-
dicate the end of race-conscious classifications. "The point of [the
strict scrutiny test] is precisely to distinguish legitimate from ille-
gitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmaking.'
156
2. The Continuing Importance of Diversity as a
Compelling Interest
Hopwood bears little precedential value and Bakke remains the
controlling law on this subject. Therefore, attaining a diverse student!1 .. . .157
body continues to be a compelling interest in itself because it con-
tributes to academic freedom, a special concern of the First
Amendment. s Moreover, diversity should be seen as a compelling
interest because it is essential to equality.
Since Bakke, members of the Court have recognized that pro-
moting diversity is a legitimate goal." 9 It is likely that Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter will support a narrowly tai-
lored race-conscious diversity admissions program.60 It seems
155. Id. at 945-46.
156. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113; see also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 963-64 ("Justice
O'Connor expressly states that Adarand is not the death knell of affirmative action-to
which I would add, especially not in the framework of achieving diversity in public
graduate schools") (citing Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117).
157. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978).
158. Id. at 312 ("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitu-
tional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.");
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), cited in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312;
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter J., concurring) ("It is
the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation.") quoted in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
159.- "The goal of providing 'role models' . . . should not be confused with the very
different goal of promoting racial diversity among the faculty." Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 n.* (1985) (O'Connor J., concurring in part); "In the context
of public education, it is quite obvious that a school board may reasonably conclude
that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body that
could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white faculty." Id. at 315 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600
(1990) (Brennan,J. plurality opinion).
160. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Gins-
burg, J.) ("The proposition that fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to
justify [a racial classification] is not inconsistent with the Court's holding today.");
Bakke amicus curiae brief by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Frank Askin on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union et al.; urging reversal; Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446
(1st Cir. 1991) (opinion by Breyer, C.J.) (upholding a race-conscious promotion pro-
gram that was narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest).
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equally likely that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, and Kennedy
will not support such a program."' Given the 4-4 split among the
Justices on the issue of diversity, Justice O'Connor may carry the
day should the Court again address the issue of diversity admis-
sions programs in higher education. In her dissenting opinion in
Metro Broadcasting, Justice O'Connor, speaking for four justices,
stated: "modern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one
[compelling] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination.
The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is
clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too in-
substantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing
racial classifications."'1 62 Taken by itself, this statement paints a bleak
picture for diversity admissions programs. However, there may be
cause for guarded optinism. "Because of [her] opinion in Wygant,
1
63
and because... [Croson did not prohibit the government] from con-
sidering race in those circumstances, it is difficult to believe that
Justice O'Connor would vote to prohibit any consideration of race
for the purpose of promoting racial diversity in a state university's
body...."'
Although Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand imposes strict
scrutiny on all racial classifications, she has extended an open invi-
tation to consider education in different terms than construction
contracts'6 when she stated that "strict scrutiny does take 'relevant
161. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) ("In my view, government can never have a 'compelling
interest' in discriminating on the basis of race .. "); Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[Racial classifications] ultimately have
a destructive impact on the individual and our society."); Minnick v. Cal. Dept. of
Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 127 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice
Stewart's dissent, in which he argued that the lower court erred in holding that the
state could consider race in making promotion decisions but joining the court's dis-
missal of certiorari on jurisdictional grounds); Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 631-38
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
162. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
163. In Wygant, Justice O'Connor endorsed the "promotion of racial diversity... in
the context of higher education" as being "sufficiently 'compelling' ... to support the
use of racial considerations in furthering that interest." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286. Justice
O'Connor also implicitly approved of the goal of "promoting racial diversity among
the faculty" of a school. Id. at 288. However, it is significant that Justice O'Connor's
decision in Adarand does not mention her support for these issues when discussing the
Court's opinion in Wygant. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109.
164. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, § 14.10 at 689 (footnotes omitted).
165. See Akhil Amar & Neal Katyal, Beyond Bakke, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 15, 1995, at 6.
Amar and Katyal identify three essential ways that universities are different from
government contracting: "First, set-aside contracts are often given to minority-
controlled corporations, not individuals," whereas accepting a candidate for admission
"operates directly on an individual level." Id. "Second, contracts are jobs that the gov-
ernment wants done, but education is principally concerned with investing citizens
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
differences' into account-indeed that is its fundamental purpose.
The point of [subjecting racial classifications to strict scrutiny] is
precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in
governmental decision making."'166 By not ruling that the use of race
is per se unconstitutional, Justice O'Connor leaves room for
"legitimate uses of race" among which could be educational diver-
sity. If Justice O'Connor supports diversity as a compelling interest,
it seems at least possible, and perhaps likely, that a narrowly tailored
diversity admissions program would be upheld.
C. Defining a Narrowly Tailored Diversity Program
In order to pass constitutional muster, a diversity proram
must be "narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest." 6 The
Court has identified four factors to consider in determining whether
race-conscious remedies are appropriate: 1) the effectiveness of
alternative remedies; 2) the duration and flexibility of the relief; 3)
the relationship between the remedy's numerical goals and the
percentage of minorities in the relevant population; and 4) the
impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.'9 Where applicable,
the University of Texas School of Law's 1992 admissions program
will be used as a point of reference for addressing these four factors.
1. The Effectiveness of Alternatives
In 1994, the United States General Accounting Office studied
the use and perceived value of minority-targeted scholarships by
undergraduate, graduate, and professional schools.' 69 The study in-
dicated that some school officials opined that elimination of
minority-targeted scholarships would hinder their ability to recruit
and retain minority students.70 Moreover, the study revealed that
school officials who believed that minority-targeted scholarships
with skills." Id. "A cash bonus is a blatant race-based handout, while a seat in a chem-
istry class is a hand-up." Id. "Third, contracts are awarded to" minority-controlled
firms without any "logical stopping point" whereas "higher education... can be the
ramp to a level playing field-with no further affirmative action-for the rest of your
future." Id.
166. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
167. "[A] racial affirmative action program might be upheld if the Court found that
it was narrowly tailored to promote diversity, it did not involve stigmatizing or
stereotyping persons on the basis of race, and it did not involve the use of numerical
goals or quotas .. " NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, § 14.10 at 688.
168. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (citing Sheet Metal Workers
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481 (1986) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
169. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 35, at 1.
170. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
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were less helpful in their efforts to foster diversity identified an
"aggressive minority recruitment campaign" as contributing to their
success in recruiting and retaining minority students. 7' These find-
ings suggest that diversity admissions programs are necessary to
further the goal of a diverse student body.
Because of Texas' past discriminatory practices, the University
of Texas Law School has developed a reputation as a "white institu-
tion.,'' "Recent racial incidents, although not officially sanctioned
by the school, have reinforced the perception that the university is
hostile to minorities and has hurt its ability to recruit minority stu-
dents. ,1 73 Additionally, many public schools in Texas continued to
have a substantial degree of racial and ethnic segregation during the
decades in which the majority of 1992 law school applicants at-
tended primary and secondary school.1 74 "This segregation has
handicapped the educational achievement of many minorities. The
ultimate effect of the inferior educational opportunity, combined
with the lower socioeconomic status of minorities in Texas, is a dis-
proportionately smaller pool of minority applicants to law school.' 75
Given these problems, it is unlikely that the law school could
achieve a diverse student body without a race-conscious admissions
program.7 6 "Alternatives, such as minority scholarships and in-
creased minority recruitment, while effective tools in conjunction
with the [diversity admissions program], would not be effective
means by themselves to meet the compelling governmental interests
of true diversity and remedying the effects of past de jure segrega-
tion. 177
Institutions which have been fortunate to not have had de jure
segregation in their past may justify the need for a race-conscious
admissions program to obtain a diverse student body along similar
lines. Even though there has not been any de jure segregation in an
institution's history, the institution may still have developed
perceptions as being a "white institution" or as hostile to minorities
which may hurt its ability to recruit diverse students. This may be
especially true at the more prestigious law schools. An institution's
elite status may deter diverse applicants, particularly those of lower
171. Id. at 10. Other factors the schools identified as contributing to their schools'
success in recruiting and retaining minority students included "minority student as-
sociations on campus, minority administrators, and faculty members who served as
role models for minority students, and academic support services for minority stu-
dents having trouble with their classes." Id.
172. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp at 572 (citation omitted).
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 573.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 573-74.
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economic status, from applying. Even if active recruiting or
increased numbers of diversity scholarships could alleviate the
problem of a small applicant pool, without a race-conscious
admissions program, many of the diverse applicants may not be
admitted. Moreover, the perception that the institution is
traditionally white (which translates to hostile to minorities) could
prevent accepted applicants from matriculating. Ultimately, those
who matriculate may be driven to leave an institution where they
feel unwelcome. This illustrates the importance of the three stages of
a diversity admissions program as mentioned previously
17
1
(recruitment, admission, and retention) and why there must be a
concerted effort at each stage of the process. Efforts in one stage,
without corresponding efforts in another will not produce a diverse
student body. At a minimum, race-conscious measures at the
admissions stage are necessary to admit significant numbers of
diverse students.
Most law schools do not publicize the relevant data necessary
to make a determinative conclusion with regards to the impact of
race-conscious measures. 79 Moreover, some scholars opine that an
end to race-conscious measures would leave many of the nation's
law schools wanting for African American, Latino, and Native
American students.18 "[TIhe luck of the draw, supplemented by a
general policy of seeking students with different backgrounds and
life experiences, will achieve diversity in almost every important
respect except race and ethnicity." 8 Thus, a diversity program that
does not employ race-conscious methods would likely prove to be
ineffective.
a. Duration and Flexibility
Two goals of diversity have been articulated to set the temporal
parameters of diversity admissions programs: 1) reducing the gap
between the credentials of diverse applicants and those of applicants
from the dominant culture and 2) achieving a representative per-
178. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
179. Farber, supra note 10, at 913-14 (1994). The fact that racially diverse profes-
sionals earn less than their white counterparts with equal educations shows that
discriminatory practices in the community from which the school's applicant pool is
derived could conceivably perpetuate the lower economic status of the disempowered
groups. Although evidence of the lower economic status of disempowered groups, by
itself, would seem to be a weak foundation on which to base a race-conscious diver-
sity program, it might be persuasive if a nexus could be drawn between such evidence
and the great expense of a law school education resulting in a small applicant pool.
180. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 31.
181. Id. at 863 n.26 (emphasis deleted).
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centage of diverse students in the entering classes. These goals are
problematic from the perspective of creating diversity. First, the goal
of narrowing the gap in credentials rigidly focuses on meritocratic
measures and ignores the beneficial characteristic of being diverse.
Instead of narrowing this gap, the drafters of programs might con-
sider eliminating it by creating one set of presumptive admission
and denial lines and defining "equally qualified" zones. 82 Second,
the goal of achieving a representative percentage of diverse students
in the entering classes may be justified at schools which have had de
jure discrimination in their history, but a diversity program does not
advocate proportional representation. Since the composition of di-
verse students may change throughout the years, a diversity
program must adapt and change with the changing demographics of
each student body.
A definition of diversity that uses specific threshold factors
provides a viable alternative to affirmative action programs with
strictly defined numerical goals. The goal of promoting the mean-
ingful exchange of diverse views is essential to education and will
exist as long as the need for education exists. Unlike affirmative ac-
tion rationales for admissions programs, 83 there is no definitive end
to the goal of achieving diversity. Diversity programs recognize the
long lasting benefits of exposure to different people's perspectives
and give credit to applicants for being diverse, even in the absence
of past discrimination. The lack of an endpoint in the achievement of
diversity may seem troublesome to some. However, recognizing the
persistent social reality of race mandates the continued use of race as
one factor in promoting diversity.
A program must remain flexible in order to effectively promote
diversity. Such flexibility may be achieved in the following ways: (1)
adaptation of its goals in accordance with the changing demograph-
ics of the applicant pool; (2) examination of all aspects of diversity in
order to place each applicant on equal footing; and (3) periodic re-
view of the program's results and creation of timetables and goals to
improve the effectiveness of the program. Additionally, since the
type of diversity program advocated in this Article does not advo-
cate any lowering of standards, an institution is not required to
182. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
183. With regard to duration, the court in Hopwood noted that "the law school has
not stated precisely how long it envisions maintaining its [race-conscious] admissions
program." Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 575. The court noted that "as the minority appli-
cant pool improved, the admissions committee made the decision not to admit greater
numbers of minority students but to attempt to close the gap in credentials of minority
and non-minority students .. . to the point where affirmative action will not be re-
quired to achieve a representative percentage of minorities in the entering classes." Id.
These observations by the court focus on the affirmative action element of the law
school's program and do not address the duration of the diversity portion.
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admit minority applicants whose traditional academic indicators
render them unqualified. However, a diversity program should be
flexible in other ways. A diversity program also must be "flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light... of
the particular qualifications of each applicant, and place them on the
same footing for consideration."'85 This approach coincides with a
diversity program's emphasis on the whole person of the applicant
and runs counter to strict adherence to inflexible academic ratings.
Applicants should be allowed to indicate whether they wish to be
considered diverse because they possess any of the previously
stated, factors or characteristics."" Admissions offices must place
184. In Paradise, the decision from which the four factors of a narrowly tailored
affirmative action program originate, Justice Brennan noted that a plan requiring one-
Black-for-one-white promotion was flexible in that it could be waived if no qualified
Black candidates were available. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 177(1987).
185. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978).
186. See, e.g., University of San Diego School of Law, Application for Admission for Juris
Doctor Program 2 (1995) (giving applicants the option to indicate diversity characteris-
tics in question 15). In generating its 1997 application for admission, the University of
San Diego School of Law decided against asking whether the applicant wishes to have
any relevant diversity factors (including racial or ethnic diversity, physical disability,
economic background, or history of overcoming hardship) considered in the evalua-
tion of the application. University of San Diego School of Law, Application for Admission
for Juris Doctor Program 1 (1997). Possibly, this question was removed in response to
the so-called California Civil Rights Initiative "CCRI" and other political pressures
against race-conscious measures. It is precisely this type of overreaction to political
rhetoric that this Article aims to dissuade.
A brief note on the CCRI is warranted. Proposition 209 amends Article I of the
California State Constitution by adding section 31, which states: "[t]he state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting," therefore prohibiting the
adoption of race- or gender-based affirmative action programs in the public sector.
CAL. CONST. art 1, § 31(a). On November 6, 1996, the day that Proposition 209 passed
by a margin of 54% to 46%, a group of civil rights advocates including the NAACP
and the Coalition for Economic Equity, filed suit to stop its implementation. Coalition
for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1520 (N.D. Cal 1996) (order
granting preliminary injunction). The court restrained and enjoined the
implementation of Proposition 209 pending trial or final judgment in the action. Id. at
65-66. On April 8, 1997 a three-judge motions panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
measure does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. Pamela A. MacLean, 9th Circuit Panel Lifts Prop. 209 Injunction, L.A.
DAILY J., Apr. 9, 1997 at Al. The panel was originally seated only to consider a stay of
the preliminary injunction but, following oral arguments, announced that it would
rule on the merits. Id. The plaintiffs will seek a full eleven judge hearing by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the issue may ultimately be decided by the United
States. Supreme Court.
For purposes of this Article, it is important to note two things. First, a properly
crafted diversity admissions program that defines merit to factor in racial diversity
should not fall within the language of Proposition 209. See CAL. CONST. art 1, § 31(a).
Second, even if Proposition 209 is ultimately held to be constitutional, it does not affect
the ability of private institutions to implement affirmative action programs.
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greater emphasis on the personal statement where applicants have
an opportunity to explain how they are diverse and relate ties to
their ethnic communities. ' 7 Such ties may take the form of
"participat[ion] in a student organization like la Alianza, or pub-
lic[ation of] an article exploring the concerns of her community, or
work[ing] in a capacity which directly benefited her community."'9 8
By giving the personal statement great weight in combination with
traditional academic indicators a diversity program will allow more
flexibility by considering the qualities of all applicants who apply as
diverse. Finally, a diversity program must be flexible in that, like the
University of Texas law school's program, it is regularly reviewed
and adjusted to evaluate the program's necessity and efficacy.89 A
diversity program should be flexible enough to target various ele-
ments of diversity after regular evaluation of its goals and efficacy
determines that those elements may be lacking.
b. Relationship of the Numerical Goals
to the Relevant Population
Since diversity programs do not seek proportional representa-
tion and set no numerical goals, it is difficult to determine how goals
will be applied to a diversity program that does not include an as-
pect of remedying past discrimination. One of the four factors set
forth by the Court in Paradise to determine the appropriateness of
race-conscious remedies is the relationship between the numerical
goals and the relevant population. 90 The application of this factor to
diversity programs is problematic, particularly when such programs
do not have a remedial rationale. The relevant population element of
this factor is difficult to define as well. 9' The relevant pool from
which diverse applicants are selected will vary from school to
school. Furthermore, the fact that most law schools accept applicants
from around the nation makes it difficult to see how the relevant
pool will be determined. School-specific statistics regarding the re-
cruitment of minorities and their subsequent graduation from
187. Haney-Lopez, supra note 7, at 56 (arguing that an applicant has "community
ties" in cases where the applicant has clear public affiliation with his or her commu-
nity); See Brest & Oshige, supra note 31, at 876 (advocating an intermediate position
between leaving an applicant's diversity entirely up to the applicant's self-
identification and allowing the institution to undertake an independent assessment of
an applicant's membership in a particular racial group).
188. Haney-Lopez, supra note 7, at 56.
189. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 575.
190. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (citing Sheet Metal Workers v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481 (1986)).
191. Id. at 171.
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specific schools may be used to evaluate this element. 92 Addition-
ally, the school's goals will determine its admissions preferences. A
school that is trying to build the state bar may give preference to re-
cruiting in-state students likely to stay in the state.'93
Although the Fifth Circuit did not address the flexibility of
UT's 1992 admissions program, the district court in Hopwood found
that this factor was easily met under the facts in that case. The dis-
trict court noted that the law school did not set "goals that reflect the
percentage of minorities in the general population or the percentage
of minorities attending college [but rather set goals that were] gen-
erally in line with the percentages of black and Mexican American
college graduates in the State of Texas."'9 4 Because these goals
stemmed from the Office of Civil Rights' investigation 95 and the re-
sulting Texas Plan, the court found them to be "reasonable and
logically related to the size of the relevant pool of minority prospects
for higher education."96 However, the problem still remains for
schools that did not participate in de jure discrimination. Ultimately,
this factor may not be applicable to diversity programs that do not
have a remedial rationale.
c. Impact on the Rights of Individual Applicants
The Bakke court took great exception to the fact that Davis' ad-
missions program created a quota isolating the ethnically diverse
applicants from comparison with other candidates for the available
seats.97 This practice constituted a facial intent to discriminate
against other applicants and a disregard of their individual rights as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.'98 Similarly, the consti-
tutional infirmity of UT's 1992 program was that it failed to compare
each individual applicant with the entire pool of applicants, but in-
stead compared applicants only to others of the applicant's race."'
The district court in Hopwood, focusing on the remedial aspect of
UT's program, stated that while "overcoming the effects of past dis-
192. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 35, at App. IV (describing a study of
six schools that used minority-targeted scholarships in recruitment, retention, and
graduation of racial or ethnic minorities).
193. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
194. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 575.
195. See id. at 556 (stating that the court-ordered investigation conducted by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare Office for Civil Rights found that Texas
retained vestiges of its former de jure racially segregated system of public higher edu-
cation, and that Hispanics were significantly underrepresented in state institutions).
196. Id. at 575.
197. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,319 (1978).
198. See id. at 320 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1947)).
199. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 579.
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crimination is an important goal ... [t]he preservation and protec-
tion of individual rights are equally important.""2 ' Through
application of the same reasoning, diversity programs of the type
discussed in this Article should not trammel the rights of individual
applicants.
In order to protect individual rights there must be a one-to-one
comparison between all applicants. A diversity program must al-
low the diverse applicants to compete with all other applicants. This
will likely entail the admissions committee having to read the files
of all applicants within the discretionary zone.20 This would not
preclude the use of "equally qualified zones" as described earlier.
Rather, the use of "equally qualified zones" may be a way an ad-
missions program could divide the files into manageable groups. It
is not necessary, nor is it feasible, for each individual member of the
admissions committee to read each individual applicant file. By
having the entire pool of "discretionary" applicant files reviewed by
one committee, the committee members can then make more appro-
priate comparisons between the applicants.20 3 As a supplementary
measure, it may also be useful to have student group review. M In
addition, another way to ensure that all applicants are compared
together, thereby protecting each applicant's individual rights is to
have the final authority to admit all applicants reside in one entity.
That one entity, after reviewing all recommendations made by those
who reviewed the files, and after comparing each applicant with the
200. Id.
201. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318; see also Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 577-78.
202. Subsequent to the initiation of the Hopwood litigation, the University of Texas
Law School altered its admission procedures to provide for individual review of all
applications by a single committee. However, the law school has maintained its ad-
mission preferences for African Americans and Mexican Americans. Weekend Edition:
Affirmative Action in Higher Education to High Court, (NPR radio broadcast, June 11,
1995), available in LEXIS News Library, SCRIPT File.
203. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 577, (citing testimony of Paul Brest, Dean of the
Stanford Law School).
204 Some law schools provide applicants with the opportunity to have their files
reviewed by a student group of their own race. These student group assess the
applicant's diversity and then make recommendations on the applicant's
admissibility. Although it may be argued that the student review of only racially
diverse applicants amounts to a separate admissions procedure for the racially
diverse, this is not the case. It does not follow that all applicants must be given the
opportunity for student review in order to justify its usage for diversity applicants. It
should suffice that all the files are being reviewed by the entire admissions committee.
Diversity student review of racially diverse applicants would be a needed step in
accurately gauging the diversity of a particular applicant. It is reasonable to assume
for example, that a professor who is part of the dominant culture will not have as
much experience to relate to an applicant's personal statement describing growing up
in an Asian American family as an Asian American student may have. The professor
may require the opinion of an Asian student as an advisor to glean more insight into
the applicant's diversity.
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entire pool, will be able to make an individualized decision. This
procedure serves the function of insuring that the individual's rights
are protected. Although this process may seem burdensome and in-
convenient, these costs are small in relation to the many benefits of
increasing diversity in a student body. In sum, the best way to alle-
viate any suspicion that there may be an unconstitutional review
procedure or an impermissible quota is to have a single entity re-
view all the files, ensuring that a certain number of admissions slots
are not set aside for particular groups.
II. THE IDEAL DIVERSITY PROGRAM
As stated previously, diversity, in the general sense, is the per-
sonal characteristic of being different from the majority or dominant
culture. 20s Although diversity may be defined in these general terms,
diversity admissions programs require a more specific definition.
Many educational institutions' admissions departments avoid using
specific definition of diversity. This avoidance may be due in part to
the amorphous nature of the concept and the criteria upon which it
is based, and in part because of the fear that promulgating a specific
definition could subject them to litigation. Some programs may fall
into the trap of using a definition of diversity that is so broad that it
ceases to be useful in terms of recruiting individuals from disem-
powered groups. Specificity is achieved not by numbers or
percentages, but by the use of specific threshold questions. In order
to avoid this trap and create an effective diversity program, a spe-
cific definition of diversity that will withstand strict scrutiny is
required. In Bakke, Justice Powell stated that "[t]he diversity that
furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a [broad] array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is
but a single though important element., 20 6 Given this, it stands to rea-
son that a definition of diversity that considers other elements in
addition to race will withstand strict scrutiny. What constitutes di-
versity will be based on various factors including the applicant's
race, gender, whether the applicant hails from a location which
would add geographic diversity to a particular student body, and
the institution's goals and history.
Although the elements which an institution chooses to consider
as part of its definition of diversity may include any number of per-
sonal characteristics, there are characteristics which should exclude
an individual from being considered diverse and ensure that others
205. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
206. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
207. Brest & Oshige, supra note 31, at 856.
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are included in the definition. Individuals from the dominant cul-
ture are not diverse. To say that the dominant group or viewpoint is
not diverse is a tautology. However, this statement is not an advo-
cacy for an essentialist reduction of the various multicultural
viewpoints to majority and non-majority perspectives. Moreover, an
individual from the dominant group may have significant life expe-
riences which provide that individual and diverse viewpoint. This
points out the distinction between "group diversity" and
"individual diversity." Although diversity programs are targeted at
disempowered groups, their objective is to examine each applicant
as an individual, not merely as a member of a group. Race is not
only a social grouping, it is a personal characteristic. The question,
then, is whether ethnic individuals who have been assimilated will
qualify as diverse or whether they merely compound the dominant
culture. The answer lies in broadly evaluating each applicant in
terms of what qualities the applicant possesses which could benefit
the institution.
Diversity programs must target disempowered groups as a
starting point to seeking diverse individuals. The disempowered
status of outside groups makes their presence especially relevant to
a school's educational mission and requires special consideration to
ensure representation of their views.20" However, this does not pre-
clude ethnic individuals who are fortunate enough to be able to
access mainstream society from qualifying as diverse. Selena Dong
has observed, "[w]hile educational diversity may justify giving some
208. Id. at 872. This raises the question of whether economic disadvantage in itself
is a sufficient threshold factor for diversity. The answer is "no." Although the views of
economically disadvantaged whites are valid, they are no more important, and should
not be given more weight than, the views of the economically disadvantaged who are
racially diverse. Programs that only focus on socioeconomic factors essentially place
more importance on the views of economically disadvantaged whites and disregard
the salient difference of race and the importance of cultural diversity. This statement
doesn't attempt to invalidate the experience of poor whites. Rather, it seeks to em-
phasize the validity of the experience of poor people of color and recognize that there
is a tangible difference in the quality of these two experiences.
In response to the recent attacks on race-conscious programs, some schools
have changed their diversity admissions programs to focus on "economically
disadvantaged" applicants. Telephone interview with Joy P. St. John, Student Member,
96-97 UCLA Faculty Admissions Committee (April 3, 1997). In light of the so-called
California Civil Rights Initiative ("CCRI"), the Faculty Senate Admissions Committee
at the University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, changed their admission
policy by not considering race and focusing on socioeconomic factors. Id. However,
this is an unnecessary and ineffective reaction. Economic disadvantage is not a
suspect class; race and gender are. Moreover, preliminary data indicate that the
number of diverse students at UCLA will decrease as a result of the new admissions
program; out of the entire 1997 applicant pool, only 23 Black applicants would be
admitted, and only three would be expected to matriculate. Id. As of April 2, 1997,
UCLA had admitted 850 out of 900 expected total admits and only 21 admits were
Black Id.
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racial minority groups preferential treatment relative to [the domi-
nant culture] this goal should never be used to justify giving [the
dominant culture] preferential treatment relative to a minority
group.
,2 °9
However, group identification, be it with a disempowered
group or the dominant culture, is not dispositive of an individual's
diversity or lack thereof. Whether an individual is diverse does not
depend solely upon his or her membership in certain racial groups,
socio-economic status, or social or political viewpoints. Rather, di-
versity extends as a combination of these factors, and, in the final
analysis, is a personal characteristic measured by the individual's
ability to add to the diversity of the student body. The purpose of a
diversity program is to increase the representation of the disempow-
ered, thereby fostering a robust exchange of ideas. Most often this is
accomplished by focusing on disempowered groups in order to give
disempowered individuals the opportunity to have their voices
heard. However, it is conceivable that an institution could find that
an individual member of the dominant culture would add to the
diversity of the student body because of their varied life experiences
or some other factor deemed relevant by the institution. Similarly, an
individual's identification with a group that is traditionally consid-
ered disempowered does not, in and of itself, indicate that the
individual is diverse.
The challenge comes in establishing a balance between recog-
nizing the disempowered status of certain groups and protecting the
rights of individuals. One way to resolve this tension is to employ a
two-part process: the first part focusing on whether the applicant is a
member of a group which historically has been discriminated
against; the second focusing on the applicant's ability to add a level
of diversity which the school, to a degree, is lacking. Because "[a]
meaningful evaluation between [all applicants]" is "a crucial ele-
ment for protection of individual rights,"21 all applicants should be
given the chance to show diversity. Specific diversity programs may
choose to include other factors such as unusual life experience
(single mother, unique job, etc.) as threshold tests. However, racial
diversity should always be included in evaluating who will be con-
sidered diverse. Once an applicant passes the threshold tests,
usually by demonstrating membership in a disempowered group, it
is up to the individual to prove his or her diversity in the personal
statement. It is at this point that the individual's community ties and
209. Selena Dong, "Too Many Asians ": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination
Against Asian-Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN L. REV. 1027, 1029
(1995). Admissions programs that focus on socio-economic factors and disregard race
essentially give preferences to poor whites over racially diverse applicants.
210. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 578; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
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his or her commitment to promoting diversity should be given con-
sideration.
The purpose of diversity programs, fostering a robust exchange
of ideas by increasing the representation of the disempowered, may
be served directly by admitting disempowered individuals, or indi-
rectly by admitting individuals who, while not having experienced
difficulty accessing mainstream society, are committed to increasing.
the representation of the disempowered. An applicant who presents
a history of commitment to increasing diversity may reasonably be
expected to continue that commitment at law school. Brest and
Oshige caution that "an inquiry into an applicant's cultural identifi-
cation can easily blur into an inquiry into his [or her] social or
political viewpoints. 211 Brest and Oshige go on to disagree with the
suggestion, "that there are 'black' and 'white' ways of thinking, and
with the possible implication that affirmative action is not served by
admitting conservative minority students. 2 However, given the
fact that a diversity program seeks to ensure the adequate represen-
tation of disempowered groups in order to foster the robust
exchange of ideas, admitting an applicant whose life experiences
indicate a commitment to increasing diversity and therefore whose
goals coincide with the goals of the program, would only seem logi-
cal.
In addition to the above thoughts on the definition of diversity
applicable to an admissions programs, there are three important
points institutions should consider. First, emphasis on the whole
person is essential to achieving a diverse student body. Second, race-
conscious admissions programs are necessary to achieve a diverse
student body. In light of the stringent requirements imposed by the
strict scrutiny test, some institutions may be inclined to ignore race
as a consideration or to adhere strictly to academic indicators for
determining acceptable applicants. However, it is neither necessary,
nor beneficial to adopt such rigid measures. Third, the work of a di-
versity program does not end once the diverse applicants
matriculate. Rather, a diversity program must take steps to ensure
that the diverse students are not stigmatized and thereby discour-
aged from raising their voices and contributing to the exchange of
ideas, or worse yet, forced to leave school because of the hostility of
the educational environment.
211. Brest & Oshige, supra note 31 , at 876.
212. Id.
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A. Emphasis on the Whole Person
The ideal diversity program will not use traditional academic
measures as its sole criteria for admittance but instead will admit
qualified applicants based upon an examination of the whole per-
son. With regards to determining who is qualified for admission,
law schools have traditionally looked at academic indicators which
are intended to predict an applicant's academic performance. These
usually include the applicant's grade point average ("GPA") from
their undergraduate school and the applicant's score on a standard-
ized test, the Law School Aptitude Test ("LSAT"). Together, the GPA
and the LSAT score are used to obtain an index number which ad-
missions committees use to determine which applicants to accept.1
13
The use of these index numbers as a starting point in admissions
programs is justified by a need for efficiency because the number of
applicants for a limited number of seats renders an extensive or in-
dividualized screening process impractical. T However, the need for
efficiency does not excuse selection of applicants based on minimal
differences in index numbers without assessing whether such dif-
ferences are meaningful."" Professor Michael Selmi explains:
If there is a .3 correlation between LSAT scores and first
year law school grades, then only 9% of the variance in
grade point averages will be explained by LSAT scores.
This [indicates] . . . that the test does not provide the ex-
planation [for the remaining variance]. Instead, other
factors such as study habits, interest in the subject matter
or effort may be better, or stronger, predictors of first-year
grades than the test itself .... [11n educational decisions,
schools will often have access to information that may
provide insight into whether an applicant possesses these
other factors that were not accounted for by the test....
The point here is that just as there is no reason to ignore
test scores altogether, there is no reason that test scores
should be afforded more weight than they deserve. Test
scores have no talismanic quality-they may provide use-
213. The use of index numbers varies at each institution. Such information often is
not publicly available.
214. Cf. Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirnative
Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1256 (1995) (explaining how efficiency concerns
cause employers to rely on employment tests to screen job applicants).
215. Cf. id. at 1261 (citation omitted) (1991) ("Strict top-down ranking of
candidates . . . assumes that even very small differences in test scores represent
meaningful and accurate distinctions in terms of the level of job performance to be
expected after hire.").
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ful information, but a particular test score does not provide re-
liable or precise comparative information ....21
In sum, many applicants falling between an institution's pre-
sumptive admission and presumptive denial scores may have score
differences which are statistically meaningless. Among these
"equally qualified"217 applicants, a candidate's ability to add to the
diversity of the student body should be given consideration as a
meritorious trait.
Many critics of diversity admissions programs claim that race-
conscious measures compromise merit. However, the concept of
merit and the goal of racial diversity are not mutually exclusive.219
"Admissions officials across the nation, from Berkeley to Harvard,
agree" that maintaining or improving the prestige of an educational
institution is compatible with commitment to substantial minority
representation.2" Although the traditional interpretation of the term
216. Id. at 1264, 1276 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
217. This is not to say that all applicants whose index numbers fall within the zone
between presumptive admission and its presumptive denial are equally qualified.
This zone may be rather large and is dependent on the admissions program. Never-
theless, within this zone smaller bands may be drawn within which the index numbers
are not reliably different. These bands would better identify equally qualified appli-
cants. Selmi, supra note 214 at 1275-76 (stating that bands or zones created by
standard error of measurement can be used reliably to differentiate test scores and
even when this method is not used initially, a court may apply such methodology in
its review).
218. GABRIEL J. CHIN ET AL., BEYOND SELF-INTEREST: ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS
TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF JUSTICE, A POLICY ANALYSIS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, II.B
[1] n.33 (1996). Professors Gabriel Chin, Sumi Cho, Jerry Kang, and Frank Wu quote
Berkeley's chancellor, Chang-Lin Tien, as stating, "The numbers dispel the notion that
diversity has somehow sacrificed the quality of [Berkeley]. In fact, the diversity has
been coupled with rising standards." Id. at II.B.2.a (citing Chang-Lin Tien, Affirming
Affirmative Action, in COMMON GROUND: PERSPECTIVES ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION...
AND ITS IMPACT ON ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS, 19, 20 (1995))
219. Id. at n.35 (citing JOEL DREYFUS & CHARLES LAWRENCE, III, THE BAKKE CASE:
THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 128 (1972)) ("discussing a remarkable increase in
standardized test scores and grades among Berkeley law students between 1967 and
1976, and of medical students nationwide between 1957 and 1975"); Jean Webb, The 6
Percent Solution: Yale Law School's Admissions Process, YALE LAW REPORT, Spring 1994,
at 15-16 (noting that Yale is the most selective law school in the country and had a 1/3
minority representation in the 1993 incoming class); Peter Applebome, The Debate on
Diversity in California Shifts, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1995, § 1 at 1 (quoting Bob Laird,
admissions director at the University of California at Berkeley, as saying, "[tihere's a
myth that in the course of diversifying the campus we've lowered our standards....
By any measure, the opposite is true.... [Tihe current freshman class is stronger than
the one 10 years ago."); Bruce Weber, Inside the Meritocracy Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 44, 46, 56 (noting that Harvard College is simultaneously
increasingly selective and committed to substantial minority representation); Philip J.
Cook and Robert H. Frank, The Growing Concentration of Top Students at Elite Schools, in
STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Charles Clotfelter and
Michael Rothschild, eds. 1993).
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
merit has been viewed in terms of past academic performance, the
concept is actually much broader. Merit may be defined as "the
ability to contribute to the achievement of valid institutional
goals., 20 No conception of merit is universal because different insti-
tutions may have different goals.22' Professors Chin, Cho, Kang, and
Wu provide the following example:
[A] law school like Stanford, seeking a national student
body, would define merit differently in some ways than
would, say, the University of Montana, which might aim
to build the state bar by recruiting in-state students likely
to stay in Montana. And though both are state-sponsored
schools, City University of New York's focus on public
interest law might make it value different qualities in pro-
spective students than the University of Montana, though
both want to produce excellent lawyers.222
How admissions officials define the term "meritorious" will
depend on the goals and purposes of their respective schools.223 Be-
ing colorblind and not being able to consider race as a factor in the
admissions process may very likely prohibit a school from attaining
some of its goals.
Many schools admit students whom they hope will be-
come civic and community leaders. For better or worse,
these communities are sometimes racially defined. A
school wholly blind to race, however, would be unable to
consider the fact that certain applicants may become politi-
cal, spiritual, and artistic leaders of such communities. Not
only would such a school be deprived of having such an
alumna, but that applicant would have been treated un-
fairly. Refusing to consider the potential suggested by an
applicant's leadership skills and background would fore-
close full evaluation of her merit.
224
220. CHIN ET AL., supra note 218, at n.33 citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., To Each Ac-
cording to His Ability, From None According to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law
of Anti-Discrimination, 60 B.U. L. REV. 815, 872 (1980) (emphasis omitted), ("[Professor
Fallon notes that this conception of merit] describes the reality of most programs of
university admissions.").
221. CHIN ET AL., supra note 218, at II.B.1 [1] (noting that the Olympic Ski Team
would define merit differently than would the Foreign Service of the State Depart-
ment, although both organizations seek excellence).
222. Id. at lI.B.1 [2].
223. See id. at II.B.1 [1] (stating that the very notion of merit fundamentally turns on
the goals and purposes of a particular institution).
224. Id. at Il.B.2c [3].
[VOL. 2:361
Race-Conscious Diversity
Admissions programs need not choose between merit and di-
versity; they can have both. This Article calls upon law school
admissions programs to recognize the merits of diversity and rede-
fine their concept of merit accordingly."5
B. Race as a Crucial Element of Diversity
The ideal diversity program ensures the representation of
disempowered groups and uses race-conscious methods to accom-
plish this goal. In addition to any other factors an institution may
deem necessary to include in its definition of diversity, race should
always be included as a crucial element of the definition, and as a
threshold test. Although race has been viewed by some as an irrele-
vant factor,226 ignoring the importance of race in today's society
creates an unyielding colorblind society that fails to understand the
benefits of racial diversity. Furthermore, Bakke, the current control-
ling case in this area, considers race an important element of the
compelling state interest in diversity.
227
In Bakke, Justice Powell emphasized that race is not the only
element to be considered in diversity. "The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifi-
cations and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a
single though important element. '228 However, Bakke does not stand
for the principle that race cannot be considered as a factor in admis-
sions. Justice Powell merely stated that an admissions program that
"focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further
attainment of genuine diversity. '22 Nevertheless, Bakke has been
viewed as subordinating the civil rights of minorities by setting a
tone of inflexibility and racial insensitivity in the admissions proc-230
ess. Professor Roy Brooks uses post-Bakke admissions at the
University of California at Davis Medical School, the defendant in
Bakke, to illustrate this point.
225. The concept of merit is discussed in light of why Asian Americans should
support race-conscious diversity admissions programs, see infra at Part III.B.
226. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (stating that the
"ultimate goal [is] to eliminate ... from governmental decision-making such irrelevant
factors as a human being's race") (O'Connor, J.) (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 320 (1985)) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)); id. at 7517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
227. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
228. Id. (emphasis added).
229. Id.
230. RoY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE RACE PROBLEM, 32 (1990).
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In 1978, this medical school, like other state educational
institutions throughout the country, restructured its ad-
missions process to comply with Bakke. The redrawn
affirmative action plan did not, however, yield more or
even the same number of new African American students
as the pre-Bakke plan did; in fact, it produced far fewer.
The medical school at Davis has experienced a "sharp de-
cline in black enrollment since 1978. [An affirmative action
specialist's] assessment of Davis' post-Bakke affirmative
action plan ... asserts that the plan "unfortunately didn't
do as much as it could have.... It lacked a certain human
touch,.., too much reliance was placed on evaluation of a
student's application, rather than [evaluation] of 'a human
person.' ,23
Professor Brooks states that "Bakke's rejection of... racial pref-
erences has been read incorrectly by colleges and universities as
providing a mandate to assume an inflexible or insensitive attitude
toward minority applicants. 232
Refusal to consider race in admissions decisions seems an un-
necessary overreaction to concerns about individual rights. Colleges
and universities should examine the whole person of an applicant
for admission, particularly the applicant's race. "[R]ace, like gender
and illegitimacy, is an immutable characteristic which its possessors
are powerless to escape or set aside.233 Although race and ethnicity
are social constructions which spring from a "need to make racial
categorizations in a racially divided, or at least, a racially diverse
society,''2 4 the internal effects of race, are an inherent element of
one's being that affects one's experiences and perceptions. This is
not an essentialist statement that all people classified in a particular
racial group will think alike or have the same experiences and back-
ground, nor a claim that the importance of a diverse student body
depends on such a false notion. However, diversity programs
should acknowledge that people of different races and ethnicities
often have different life experiences that affect their relations with
members of other groups and influence their views on many issues
including legal doctrine and policy.
3 5
231. Id. at 101-02.
232. Id. at 102. It remains to be seen what damage the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood deci-
sion will have, despite its lack of precedential value.
233. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun JJ., concurring
in part) (citation omitted).
234. ELAINE H. KIM, ASIAN AMERICAN LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
WRITINGS AND THEIR SOCIAL CONTEXT xii (1982).
235. See id.
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Rather than trying to escape or set aside race, people should
embrace social and cultural differences and be proud of their
heritage. Furthermore, even though racial categorizations are often
used to stereotype racial minorities, they may also serve to unite the
people that are classified under them. Although unifying the various
diversity groups is not an intended purpose of a diversity program,
it is an added benefit. The bonds formed among fellow diverse
students may become the bonds between future community leaders.
The external effects of race and their historic use as oppressive tools
may cause the use of race as a way to achieving equality, to be
questioned. Nevertheless, the potential exists for race to be used as a
useful tool, both in achieving equality and in strengthening the
unity of diverse communities.
C. Avoidance of Stigma Against Diversity Program Beneficiaries
The ideal diversity program will take positive steps to ensure
that the specter of stigma does not preclude the program's direct
beneficiaries from engaging in the meaningful exchange of ideas.237
Race-conscious classifications have been criticized for promoting
notions of racial inferiority and perpetuating the "politics of racial
hostility., 238 A common misconception is that diversity programs
that utilize race-conscious classifications use race as their sole
consideration.239 It has been said that "[sluch policies may embody
stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race,
236. Advocating that the social construct of race as a means of embracing racially
diverse peoples' heritage is not intended to add fuel to the fire of those who would use
racial stereotypes to perpetuate patterns of discrimination. Neither is it a statement
that all people classified in a certain racial category think alike or necessarily share
common perspectives. The races are comprised of unique individuals whose personal
perspectives affect their view. All African Americans do not think alike, just as all
Filipinos do not think alike, nor do all Chinese, nor all whites. However, the existence
of the need to categorize signifies a uniqueness about a people. Each people poten-
tially bring with them to the table perspectives that no other race can bring. That
perspective is grown from their collective perceptions and the culture they share.
237. All people at a given campus benefit from diversity programs because they
gain from the meaningful exposure to those who are different from them and because
these programs further the goal of a society that takes account of race to transcend
racism. However, in this context, "beneficiaries" refers to those applicants who were
actually admitted under a diversity program.
238. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; see also Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 603 (O'Connor,
J. dissenting) ("The dangers of [racial classifications] are clear .... They endorse race-
based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus con-
tributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.").
239. For example, Cheryl Hopwood, the named plaintiff in Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F.
Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), complained that the University of Texas Law School ad-
missions program "only looked at race. They didn't look at anything but race."
Weekend Edition, (NPR radio broadcast, June 11, 1995).
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evaluating their thoughts and efforts-their very worth as citizens-
according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the
Constitution."'24 Given the use of index numbers to identify equally
qualified applicants among whom diversity may be used as a
deciding factor in admissions, administrators of educational
institutions should take a stronger stance in support of diversity
programs and emphasize this fact. Administrators must emphasize
to the student body and the community at large that race is not used
as the sole factor in admissions decisions but rather as one of many
factors when considering equally qualified applicants. 241 By doing
so, administrators may begin to destroy the myths that
race-conscious measures admit less qualified applicants or that
race-conscious measures constitute reverse racial discrimination.
Furthermore, this open support for diversity as a beneficial
characteristic would help to alleviate much of the stigma felt by the
beneficiaries of such programs as well as any perceptions that race-
conscious measures paint the beneficiaries as victims requiring
special treatment.
242
Emphasizing that diversity programs do not admit lesser
qualified applicants, but rather serve to differentiate among equally
qualified applicants, can abate resentment felt by individuals who
are not included in the diversity programs. The difficult task of al-
leviating the resentment felt by members of the dominant culture
may be best achieved by fostering recognition of the worth of indi-
viduals, independent of their demographics, thereby increasing
people's meaningful exposure to those who are different from243
them. Emphasizing that diversity is used only as a factor to distin-
guish among equally qualified candidates responds to the criticism
that diversity programs admit minority group members who would
not be admitted on their own "merits." Moreover, the use of
240. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 603-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Even if this
criterion is barred, this has not prevented its use by the Government or by citizens
who comprise the majority culture.
241. The above discussion prompts a quick observation regarding academic sup-
port programs. Classifying all diversity applicants as candidates for academic support
programs fosters resentment and perpetuates stigma and the myth that those students
would be unable to succeed on their own merits. Admission to academic support pro-
grams should be based on academic performance alone and not on membership in a
diversity group. Given that index numbers are used to determine equally qualified
applicants and an applicant's diversity is considered a "plus," an individual's diver-
sity is independent of his or her academic potential.
242. Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race The-
ory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1316 (1993).
243. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 31, at 863 ('We believe that encounters among
students from different backgrounds - especially within an academic institution that




race-conscious classifications and community ties as plus factors to
distinguish among equally qualified applicants is not racial dis-
crimination, but rather an emphasis on the beneficial quality of
being diverse.4 Extolling the virtues of being diverse may serve to
develop a deeper sense of self-pride among the beneficiaries of di-
versity programs, giving them the confidence and strength to
overcome the stigmas imposed by others.
Whether beneficiaries of diversity programs actually recognize
a stigma has been questioned. Professor Stephen Carter describes his
own experiences with the feelings of inferiority that affirmative ac-
tion can create. 24s However, Brest and Oshige note that in Bron
Raymond Taylor's study of affirmative action by the California
Parks and Recreation Department, beneficiaries related that, by
opening doors for advancement, the Department's program
"enhanced [their] self-esteem and self-regard."246 Professor Frank
Wu goes so far as to say that the "supposed stigmatizing effects of
affirmative action should not be given much credence" because
these effects can be attributed just as much to the programs as to the
attacks on them, because these attacks "insinuate that every member
of any minority group has accomplished what she has only by spe-
cial pleading.", 
47
These positions aside, the potential for stigmatization exists.
Administrations which employ diversity programs can minimize
any stigma such programs may engender by extolling the virtues of
being diverse and emphasizing these virtues to the student body
and society at large.
III. THOUGHTS FROM AN ASIAN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
This Article is affirms the necessity of diversity programs as a
whole and does not advocate the inclusion of any particular group
into a diversity program. That having been said, I feel called to
244. Asking an applicant to describe his or her "community ties" can fuel the appli-
cant's own interest in these community ties. My conversations with fellow students
who are beneficiaries of diversity programs have provided this insight. One Filipino
student stated that his awareness of how he has benefited from his school's diversity
admissions program, provides him with insights into class reading materials. He also
commented that it has increased his desire for, and advocacy of, cultural awareness.
245. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
BABY, Pt. I. (1992).
246. Brest & Oshige, supra note 31, at 870 (citing BRON RAYMOND TAYLOR, AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION AT WORK 83-85, 194-95 (1991)).
247. Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action,
15 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 225, 275 (1995).
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"raise my voice"24 and make a few observations regarding AsianAmericans and diversity programs.
A. On the Model Minority Myth and Law School Admissions' 9
Even though Asian immigrants come from various countries, 0
the term "Asian Americans" has been used to group us all together.
This failure to differentiate between the different Asian ethnicities25t
allows the majority to group all Asian Americans under the "model
minority" stereotype. The model minority myth is detrimental to
Asian Americans in two ways. First, Asian Americans are described
as successfully assimilated into American society because we are
"hardworking, intelligent, and successful,"252 especially as compared
to other people of color. On the other hand, the myth says that Asian
Americans, while skilled in math and science, have low verbal abili-
ties and community skills, are one-dimensional "grinds;" and lack
personality and individuality. 2,3 Politicians use the first part of the
myth to attack race-conscious admissions programs as either victim-
izing Asian Americans at the expense of other people of color, or
unnecessary in light of the success of one minority group.254 The sec-
248. I borrow this phrase from Professor Robert Chang whose work I have found
influential. See Chang, supra note 242, (announcing an Asian American Moment to the
legal academy).
249. See generally TAKAKI, supra note 19, at 474-84 (1989); Wu, supra note 247, at
228-40; Chang, supra note 242 at 1258-65.
250. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
251. I offer a personal example of this inability to differentiate between Asian
American ethnicities. Last year, a fellow student (white) who is usually well-meaning,
approached me (Filipino American) and another fellow student (Korean American)
and told us that he wished we had been in his Constitutional Law class that afternoon.
When we asked him why, he replied that they were discussing Koremastu and it would
have helped to have had "your people's personal insight."
Other examples of the inability of the majority culture to differentiate are more
harmful, as evidenced by the brutal beating of Vincent Chin in 1982. Chin, a Chinese
American, was beaten to death by two white autoworkers in Detroit, Ronald Eben and
his stepson, who thought he was Japanese and blamed him for the loss of jobs in the
American automobile industry. See Justice Dep't Reviewing Chin Case, UPI, Sept. 12,
1986, available in LEXIS, Regnews Library, UPI File.
252. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS IssuEs FACING ASIAN
AMERICANS IN THE 1990S 19 (1992); see also Wu, supra note 247, at 238 n.65 (listing
various articles about the model minority myth).
253. Brest & Oshige, supra note 31, at 893-94 (describing the model minority
stereotype) (footnotes omitted).
254. For example, California Governor Pete Wilson stated, "Twenty years ago if a
more qualified African American student was denied a position in a college class be-
cause of his or her skin, we called it discrimination and rightly condemned it. But
now, Caucasians and Asian Americans are being discriminated against in the name of
affirmative action." Prepared Statement of California Governor Pete Wilson Before the
Race-Conscious Diversity
ond part of the myth pigeon-holes Asian Americans into specific
fields (such as engineering or nursing) and reinforces glass ceilings
in employment.
This model minority myth has led "public policy makers and
corporate leaders to . . . dismiss the idea that [Asian Americans]
have any problems that require serious attention."2s Some scholars
have noted that this "laissez-faire approach" to all Asian Americans
persists "notwithstanding the tremendous heterogeneity among the
ethnicities that make up the racial category Asian Pacific
Americans .' 'V The model minority myth has had the same effect on
some admissions programs which now fail to consider Asian
257Americans as diversity applicants. For example, the Stanford
Asian and Pacific Islander Law Students Association (APILSA)
wrote a memorandum to the faculty of Stanford Law School,
questioning the Stanford Law School's treatment of all Asian
ethnicities in aggregate and the school's failure to include any of
them in the diversity admissions program.5 8 Stanford's APILSA
called for the school's admissions program to recognize the "unique
experiences" of the various Asian and Pacific Islander ethnicities
and advocated consideration of underrepresented Asian and Pacific
Islander ethnicities as a positive factor in admissions decisions.2
In a recent law review article, Paul Brest, the Dean of the
Stanford Law School, noted that the number of Asian American law
students has grown over the last decade and appears to continue to
grow with a large majority of these students being Chinese, Korean,• 260
or Japanese Americans. Brest continued, "[t]o the extent that the
status of recent immigrants is tractable and improves over time, one
would expect more group members to attend professional
schools. This disregards the fact that Filipinos are less
represented in colleges and graduate schools than Japanese and
Senate Judiciary Committee, 1996 FED. NEWS SERV., Apr. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Fednew File.
255. Good for Business: Making Full Use of the Nation's Human Capital, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 52, at d30 (Mar. 16, 1995) (describing the effect of the Model Minority
Myth in corporate America).
256. See CHIN ET AL., supra note 218, at III.B.3 [1] n.103 ("[Djifferent Asian ethnic
groups have markedly different average incomes" citing Paul Ong and Suzanne J.
Hee, Economic Diversity, in THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA: ECONOMIC DI-
VERSITY, ISSUES AND POLICIES 31-56 (Paul Ong ed., 1994)).
257. See Grace W. Tsuang, Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly
Selective Universities, 98 YALE L. J. 659 (examining the admissions criteria used at the
University of California at Berkley, Stanford, Harvard, and Brown Universities).
258. Brest & Oshige, supra note 31, at 855.
259. Id. at 855-56 (footnotes omitted). APILSA included Pacific Islanders, Filipinos,
and Southeast Asians as underrepresented groups.
260. Id. at 896-97.
261. Id. at 897.
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Chinese Americans.2 62 Filipinos are not recent immigrants so there
must be some other explanation for their underrepresentation in
higher education and in the legal profession.26 Moreover, assuming
that the Asian ethnic sub-groups that are relatively new additions to
the Asian American classification would follow the lead of their
predecessors is an implicit acceptance of the model minority myth.
This implicit acceptance perpetuates the myth and is therefore
unacceptable.
A law school should consider the educational value of having
students or faculty members from "disadvantaged Southeast Asian
or Pacific Island groups-especially those whose cultures are quite
different from those of most others at the school and who by virtue
of size or the school's geographic locale may be of significance in the
professional lives of its graduates. 2" In light of the recent changes
in the landscape surrounding race-conscious measures,2  perhaps
cautious support from school administrations is the best that advo-
262. Id. at 896 n.269. For example, the 1996 graduating class from the University of
San Diego School of Law contained 318 Juris Doctor candidates only 18% of the class
were members of minority groups. However there were only three Filipinos. This is
especially striking given the large Filipino population in San Diego. See Clark Brooks,
Who We Are: Migration is Putting New Face on San Diego County, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., Aug. 11, 1996, at 3.
263. A statistical analysis of the underrepresentation of Filipinos is beyond the
scope of this Article.
Professor Wu suggests that many Asian Americans rank the practice of law low
on their list of choices of profession for themselves or their children. Frank Wu, The
Second Most Despised Profession, L.A. DAILY J., August 25, 1995 at 6. Wu relates a story
told by Professor Harold Koh of Yale University, in which Koh's father told him that
being a lawyer was the "second least respected profession" in Korean culture, ranked
only above "acting." Id. Business, engineering, medicine, science and "anything else
that might... provide a regular income" rank above the legal profession. Id. Although
the Filipino American experience is unique among the Asian American experience in
that the Philippines was a United States territory, Filipinos have similar perception
regarding the law as a career. Speaking as a Filipino American, I can recall my parents
pushing me towards a career in medicine, engineering, even business - but never the
law. Finally, my parents acquiesced when they learned that I intend to pursue a career
as a professor. They are both educators.
264. Brest & Oshige, supra note 31, at 897.
265. California has often been in the forefront, leading the country in changing the
legal landscape. The recent decision by the University of California Regents to discon-
tinue the practice of considering an applicant's race in the admissions process and the
so-called California Civil Rights Initiative exemplify the "shaky" ground. See supra
note 205 describing how CCRI has caused UCLA's new admissions program to focus
on socio-economic factors and disregards the merit of race.
These two incidents are also examples of how politicians, California Governor
and Presidential Candidate Pete Wilson specifically, can minimize the importance of
race-conscious classifications and the goals of diversity to serve political ends. See, e.g.,
Clarence Page, The Golden State's Image is Starting to Tarnish, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 1995,
at C3 (noting that Governor Wilson supported affirmative action until he decided to
run for the Republican presidential nomination).
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cates of race-conscious measures can hope for at this time. However,
this Article advocates greater support of race-conscious measures.
B. On Whether Asian Americans
Should Support Diversity Programs
Aside from the support from school administrations, diversity
programs require the support of the Asian American community as
well. Although there may be an increasing number of Asian Ameri-
can ethnicities that are relatively well-represented, there are those
that remain under-represented. Furthermore, despite the widely
held belief that Asian Americans have succeeded in accessing
mainstream America, out of the entire American legal profession in
1990 Asian Americans comprised only 1.4% of the lawyers and only
1.02% of the total number of judges.266
Asian Americans have been painted as being the victims of
race-conscious classifications. Race-conscious classifications have
been targeted as the reason why Asian Americans are being denied
admission to highly selective schools. This argument states that if
schools would use a strictly meritocratic system and discontinue the
use of racial preferences, more higher-scoring Asian Americans
would be admitted. Alternatively, race-conscious classifications and
the call for diversity have been criticized as allowing a preference for
whites over Asians. This section addresses these two assertions and
calls for the Asian American community (inasmuch as there is a
unified community) to support the use of race-conscious methods
towards the goal of diversity in order to dispel these myths.
Some Asian Americans argue against race-conscious measures
as being inherently unfair. They accuse the quotas for other groups
of" 'taking' admission slots from Asian Americans. 267 These Asian
Americans appear to advocate a strict "meritocratic" system which
would allow "fair competition" between all groups on the basis of
test scores.
Asian Americans have been deliberately painted as innocent
victims of race-conscious measures as a justification for discontinu-
266. Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 19 (1994).
267. See, e.g., Dong, supra note 209 at 1029 n.7 (describing the double bind that
Asian American leaders face in dealing with the issue of affirmative action); Future
Watch: Affirmative Action Plays an Active Role on Campuses (CNN television broad-
cast, July 23, 1995), available in LEXIS News Library; SCRIPT File (interviewing Asian
American students who felt that race-conscious measures did not allow the best
qualified individuals to be educated).
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discontinuing their use.2  The reliance on test scores as the sole
means of determining the most qualified applicants is flawed 269 and
ignores the merits of diversity. Advocating a system that looks only
to test results furthers the loss of our culture. The majority culture
would never let itself be squeezed out by "higher-scoring Asians"
who are already viewed as being overrepresented.27 ° In fact, the
existence of "upper limit quotas" for Asian Americans at some
universities has been examinedY. In a "purely meritocratic system,"
Asian Americans can easily be disadvantaged by the manipulation
of seemingly neutral factors.272 Some scholars note that "Asian
Americans would be disadvantaged if a university gave greater
weight to the verbal portion of the SAT exam or no credit for non-
European foreign language skills. 273 Because universities have
manipulated test scores in precisely this manner, "we should be
skeptical about claims that academic merit is a scientifically
measurable characteristic that can be gauged objectively., 274 Asian
Americans should support the use of race-conscious measures to
further diversity in order to prevent the emergence of a system that
ignores the merits of cultural diversity.
Professor Wu states that "[tihe real risk to Asian Americans is
that they will be squeezed out to provide proportionate representa-
tion to whites, not due to the marginal impact of setting aside a few
spaces for African Americans. 275 Some have criticized diversity pro-
grams which call for proportional representation as creating quotas
for whites when there are "too many Asians., 276 However, diversity
does not call for proportional representation, nor does it ever call for
the majority to disadvantage an outside group, even in the course of
benefiting another group. If a differential standard of review, sub-
jecting race-conscious measures favoring whites over other groups
to strict scrutiny and subjecting race-conscious measures advantag-
ing disempowered groups to intermediate scrutiny, were to have
become the standard, it may have alleviated the danger of diversity
268. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 247, at 267-75, 277-81 (citing Michael S. Greve, The
Newest Move in Law Schools' Quota Game, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1992, at A12).
269. See supra Part II.A.
270. The sponsors of the California Civil Rights Initiative, the anti-affirmative ac-
tion ballot proposal, refer to Asian Americans as having become overrepresented in
prestigious universities. Living by the Numbers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 12, 1995, at Zi.
271. See, e.g., Tsuang, supra note 257.
272. CHIN ET AL., supra note 218 at II.B.2.b 121.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Wu, supra note 247, at 226.
276. See, e.g., Dong, supra note 209 at 1054 (stating that the diversity rational per-
petuates discrimination and exclusion by requiring Chinese Americans to score higher
on entrance exams than whites).
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programs reserving quotas for whites." However, this theoretical
safe-haven was destroyed by Adarand. In order to alleviate the dan-
ger of upper limit quotas, Asian Americans must advocate race-
conscious measures to further diversity programs which recognize
the benefits of exposure to varying cultures and do not call for pro-
portional representation. Whatever else Asian Americans decide
about race-conscious measures, "we should not allow ourselves to
be used to attack other people of color. 2 78 Moreover, Asian Ameri-
cans must understand their heterogeneity and advocate race-
conscious measures that assist underrepresented Asian ethnicities.
CONCLUSION
The time will come when past discrimination will be remedied
and there will no longer be a need for remedial race-conscious
measures. Obviously, that time is not now.279 "Regrettably, discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, gender and disability
persists in this country: not just the effects of past discrimination,
but current, real-life, pernicious discrimination. Last year . . . the
Federal government received over 91,000 complaints of discrimina-
tion in employment alone., 280 In fact, discrimination is expanding,
even finding its way into cyberspace.2" However, even after past
discrimination has been remedied, it will still be desirable to take
someone's race into consideration when determining their contribu-
tion to the diversity of the community. Diversity programs
acknowledge the internal effects of race and recognize the fact that
an individual's race colors his or her perceptions and foster mean-
ingful interaction and exchange of diverse viewpoints. Therefore,
diversity programs have a purpose that outlives remedying past dis-
crimination.
277. See id. at 1051-57.
278. Mari J. Matsuda, We Will Not Be Used, 1 UCLA ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLANDS L.J.
79, 80-81 (1994).
279. As Justice O'Connor recognized in Adarand, "[tihe unhappy persistence of
both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
groups in this country is an unfortunate reality . Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
280. Prepared Testimony of Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Civil Rights Division, before the committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitu-
tion, 1995 FED. NEWS SERV., July 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew
File.
281 See E-mail Is Becoming a Conduit of Prejudice on Many Campuses, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 1997, § 1 at 40 (describing and incident involving a hate message that was sent via
electronic mail to 700 members of the Asian Students Association at Indiana Univer-
sity in Bloomington on January 31, 1997).
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" 'Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry'
[are] 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality.' ,,28" Ensuring equality does not entail ex-
cluding a person's race from his or her persona or requiring that we
all assimilate into one. A person's race reflects their heritage. It is a
part of them-a part to be proud of and to cherish. Understanding
another person's race and culture may help to better understand their
perspectives. The key is to accept race and go beyond race to deal
with all persons as individuals. This is the goal of "erasing the color
lines." Erasing color lines is not a call for "color-blindness" or racial
ignorance. It is of utmost importance to keep traditions and cultural
values alive for future generations. Furthermore, a balance must be
struck between passing on cultural values and not perpetuating
animosity among racial or ethnic groups.
This nation of diverse individuals should never forget the roles
different races played in building this country and guiding its fu-
ture. Diversity is not equivalent to assimilation. Assimilation entails
being swallowed up into the dominant culture. Diversity is about
coming together to form a new identity-an American identity.
Although the benefits of a diverse student body seem evident,
the diversity argument for affirmative action has been criticized by
some scholars as creating a stigma. For example, Professor Richard
Delgado cautions:
In law school admissions, for example, majority persons
may be admitted as a matter of right, while minorities are
admitted because their presence will contribute to
'diversity.' . . . The assumption is that such diversity is
educationally valuable to the majority. But such an admis-
sions program may well be perceived as treating the
minority admittee as an ornament, a curiosity, one who
brings an element of the piquant to the lives of white pro-
fessors and students.2
The risk of stigma may be nullified by increased open support
for diversity programs as means of differentiating between equally
qualified applicants, extolling the merits of a diverse cultural heri-
tage, and furthering the compelling interest of diversity. Part of the
reason why a person may be stigmatized is that they are a
"curiosity" and new to a traditionally homogenous environment.
However, diversity programs that create meaningful interaction
282. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (emphasis added) (quoting Hirabay-
ashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
283. Richard Delgado, The Imperical Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 570 n.46 (1984).
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among people of diverse backgrounds and viewpoints, foster un-
derstanding and acceptance. The danger of stigma should not cause
the disempowered to forgo their quest for representation. Only by
meaningful exposure to diverse people can we learn from one an-
other and go beyond demographic categories to appreciate
individuals as individuals.
The United States is the most racially diverse nation on Earth.
Our community consists of representatives of other nations' cultures
and people. We have much to learn from one another.
Unfortunately, our opportunities to do so and utilize the knowledge
gleaned from history are diminished by opportunistic politicians
who use their positions on race-conscious classifications to ride the
popular emotional trends and further their careers. Nevertheless,
race-conscious measures should be used to increase diversity, the
benefits of which will ride above the turbulence of the political
winds. However, because of the history of abuse associated with
race-based classifications,' we are asked to ignore our individual
cultures and backgrounds and simply be "American." Asking
people to deny their history is equally as damaging. Although
benefits and burdens should not be allocated among individuals
based on "the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they
act or think,' '285 race-conscious classifications need not divide the
nation into the type of racial blocs Justice O'Connor feared, and lead
to "an escalation of racial hostility and conflict."25 Such results will
follow only if race-conscious classifications are used as the sole
indicator of how an individual would think or act.
Race is an important part of a person's history, perhaps more
so because it is partially a social construct. This nation's racial and
ethnic diversity is something to be proud of and it should be nur-
tured. Every race whose people comprise this nation has added to its
history and continues to shape its future. By fostering meaningful
exposure to diverse people and viewpoints, our nation can move
beyond race to view individuals as individuals. Focusing on persons
as individuals entails consideration of their race. For these reasons,
diversity admissions programs that focus on persons as individuals
by considering their race should be encouraged.
284. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 240 (1944) (Murphy J., dissenting)
(noting that the opponents of race-conscious classifications may base their opposition
on the claim that such classifications "destroy the dignity of the individual" and "open
the door to discriminatory actions against [minorities] in the passions of tomorrow").
285. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
286. Id.
SPRING 1997]

